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ABSTRACT 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Welton Chang 
 
Philip E. Tetlock, PhD 
 
 
Accountability is often presented as a panacea for behavioral ailments. This one-size-fits-
all approach to a multi-dimensional construct ignores a key component of the 
effectiveness of accountability systems: situational context. Situational contexts such as 
highly stochastic environments (e.g., financial markets, world politics) and politically-
charged domains (e.g., national security decision-making, domestic policy) form 
accountability boundary conditions, beyond which previous experimental effects may not 
generalize. In a series of studies, I explore the relatively under-explored frontiers of 
accountability effects, including those that apply to highly stochastic environments; 
politically-charged outcomes, where the tendency towards motivated reasoning 
dominates; and rapidly evolving states of information, where one’s ability to update one’s 
beliefs has serious implications for the quality of one’s judgments and decisions. In this 
series of studies, I find that accountability effects only appeared under certain conditions. 
In general, holding people accountable for their judgments did not improve performance 
on highly stochastic or politically-charged tasks—in fact, it sometimes made performance 
worse. However, certain types of accountability were able to boost performance in some 
contexts. These studies demonstrate the value of incorporating situational context into 
accountability experiments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Hold them accountable!” is a common refrain heard when things go wrong. 
Accountability, as popularly depicted, is the antidote for all manner of behavioral 
ailments from the unnecessary use of force by police officers to the support of unpopular 
policies and legislation by elected officials. Every day and at every turn, we feel the 
effects of being held accountable for our thoughts and actions. Workers must answer to 
employers, students to professors, law enforcement officers to city councils, CEOs to 
boards of directors, and heads of state to the electorate. People generally accept that there 
are behavioral rules that everyone must follow and that people are responsible for their 
actions under those rules (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Hobbes, 1969). A cohesive society 
can only work if there are established mechanisms for calling people to account (Tetlock, 
1992). At some point, all of us have to answer to someone.  
Accountability refers to the way in which one or more people perceive that 
someone must answer to whom, why, for what, and with what consequences (cf. Lerner & 
Tetlock 2003; Chang, Vieider & Tetlock, in preparation; Patil, Vieider, Tetlock, 2014). 
The study of accountability is no less popular today than it was in 1999, when it was 
referred to as a “modern buzzword” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In fact, accountability has 
arguably risen to the level of “cultural keyword” (Dubnick, 2014)—an unsurprising 
development given its historical trajectory. Today, accountability is a nearly ubiquitous 
method for generating predictable behavior.  
Within the social psychological literature, the anticipation of being held 
responsible for one’s actions has been shown to improve performance on tasks in both 
laboratory experiments and field studies (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). However, these 
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studies show that the effects of accountability are not uniform: within the family of 
concepts that resemble full-fledged accountability systems, only certain flavors of 
accountability lead to desired effects on certain categories of subject behavior (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999). Accountability generally works in one of two ways. First, some forms of 
accountability pressures focus the attention of subjects, which spurs higher levels of 
deliberate thinking which sometimes allows them to push aside attractive but incorrect 
intuitive answers. Second, the presence of accountability systems incentivizes subjects to 
focus on how to achieve desired outcomes (i.e., the process), thereby enabling them to 
stop obsessing unhelpfully over only the end result (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). In effect, 
accountability assumes that the skill to achieve goals is sufficient but motivation is 
lacking. However, as the definition of accountability makes clear, accountability systems 
have many components, the unique combinations of which may have different influences 
on behavior.  
Situational Context and Accountability 
One under-explored aspect of accountability systems is that of situational context 
(Chang, in preparation). While accountability systems are designed to generate 
predictable behavior from those held to account, many environments may not permit 
subjects to generate the desired behavior or may incentivize individuals to deviate from 
normatively prescribed choices. Such a situation exists when the accountable are held to 
strictly enforced yet unachievable standards.  
The under-exploration of context in accountability is related to Kahneman and 
Klein’s (2009) discussion on the environmental conditions necessary for the development 
of intuitive expertise—better judgments and decisions require “valid cues and good 
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feedback” (p. 524). The context within which people are held accountable may 
sometimes impose a hard limit on performance, making it impossible or nearly 
impossible to achieve prescribed standards. For example, being held accountable in 
highly dynamic environments such as financial markets or battlefields may not improve 
performance simply because there is a low ceiling on performance. In environments 
where the performance of those held accountable depends on the behavior of other actors 
(e.g., teachers and students, police officers and criminals, doctors and patients), again, 
those held to account do not have full control over outcomes.  
Many accountability systems are designed to improve judgments via debiasing 
and improving decisions by ensuring that certain rules are followed. While it might strike 
most as obvious that these systems should reduce errors, both false negatives (e.g., 
declaring someone a threat when they are not) and false positives (e.g., not declaring 
someone a threat when they are), there has been relatively little investigation of how 
accountability system designs push people away from committing one error over the 
other (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011b). For example, while tens of thousands of refugees 
arrive annually, the number of terrorists among them is tiny, with approximately 150 
arrested in 15 years. However, if a false negative is extremely costly, meaning a terrorist 
gets through the refugee screening process, but a false positive less so (subjecting the 
innocent to additional scrutiny), then an immigration official, accountable for keeping out 
terrorists, would rationally make it very difficult for any refugees to come into the 
country.  
By extension, it might be rational for policymakers to be very acceptant of false 
positives because the public-at-large only holds them accountable for allowing threats to 
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get through. This is because false positives caught up in the screening process 
inconvenience a minor fraction of the population and because the wider public rarely 
observes these false positives. In a sense, because policymakers feel accountable to the 
voting public, but only for those things that severely impact a critical mass of voters, the 
democratic accountability system sets up a situation where false positives are tolerated. 
This situation persists even if the aggregate cost of the false positives exceeds the costs of 
the consequences of extremely rare instances of false negatives. Even explaining signal 
detection theory to policymakers is likely not enough to change their behavior.  
 Along a similar line of thinking, another potential unintended effect of 
accountability systems begins to emerge: finding patterns in randomness that do not 
actually exist. The case of the London Blitz during World War II is illustrative: 
Londoners were convinced that the German Luftwaffe was targeting specific 
neighborhoods or strategic sites, when in fact the German bombs were not accurate 
enough to do this. A post-war analysis revealed that the bombs essentially fell at random 
throughout the city (Clarke, 1946). Other research reveals the human tendency to find 
patterns where they do not actually exist (Langer, 1975, 1977; Tune, 1964). Are 
accountability systems effective at reducing the tendency for humans to find non-existent 
patterns or do they actually lead people to find patterns in randomness?  
Politics and Accountability 
Accountability is assumed to be a critical component of democratic systems of 
governance, yet we do not fully understand the conditions under which these demands 
actually lead to improved judgments, decisions, and outcomes. Accountability is 
considered an essential feature of democracy because it provides the feedback loop that 
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theoretically improves governance and aligns policymaker choices to public opinion over 
time (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014; Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999). Most 
politicians and policymakers fear the consequences of failure in a democratic system: 
being voted out of office. This self-preservational driver is at the root of decision-making 
when it comes to what policies and legislation to support and which ones to reject. Pre-
emptive self-criticism and the additional deliberate thinking that it engenders could 
generate improved decision-making (i.e., “will my actions pass the front page of the 
Washington Post test?”) (Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). But it could also generate 
sub-optimal choices that appeal only to a narrow band of constituents or bolster 
motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). 
Does Accountability Pressure Lead to Politically-Induced Cognitive Closure? 
Citizens are interested in ensuring that political leaders are acting in their best 
interest, and electoral accountability is the primary lever they can pull to keep politicians 
honest. However, the force exerted by accountability pressures actually could be 
counterproductive insofar as it pushes political leaders to adopt ideologically-aligned 
policies while down-weighting the risks associated with policy implementation.  
Elected political leaders and appointed policymakers seek to implement policies 
congruent with their political ideology (Dutt & Mitra, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 
2009). These policy choices often involve uncertainty about whether the policy will be 
successful.  Because the outcomes from enacted policy are uncertain or risky, especially 
when the policies, pre-implementation, lack supporting empirical evidence of their 
efficacy, political leaders often default to policy preferences consistent with their 
ideology (Budge, 1994). However, the linkage between political ideology and policy 
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choice is far from direct, as this relationship is constrained by the accountability 
structures present in democracies and attenuated by the uncertainty regarding the net 
impact of the policy in question (Przeworski et al., 1999). Psychologically, by attempting 
to erase the risk or uncertainty surrounding ideologically-congruent policies, individuals 
demonstrate an increased need for cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales, 
2004; Jost, 2006; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost 
et al., 2007; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Accountability pressures, interacting with 
ideological beliefs, could exacerbate the need for closure. 
Does Accountability Put Pressure on Policymakers to Avoid Blame? 
Political actors (e.g., policymakers, pundits, legislators) typically express their 
judgments in ambiguous ways with vague verbal probabilities (e.g., likely, more often 
than not, possibly). Most recently, intelligence agencies have been criticized for 
conveying their assessments in vague verbal probabilities as opposed to more specific 
numeric ones (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2015; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011a). But are these 
actors actually behaving rationally?  
Precise numeric probabilities hold advantages for account-takers because it leaves 
little room for the accountable to wiggle out of evaluations of the accuracy of their 
judgments. Conversely, those who are held accountable may feel trapped by numeric 
probabilities and would therefore prefer vague verbal probabilities when they are seeking 
to avoid accountability. Friedman, Lerner, and Zeckhauser (2017), surveying national 
security professionals, found decision-makers were less willing to support risky actions 
when those risks were conveyed quantitatively and more willing to seek additional 
information to improve their understanding of the situation.  
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Here, accountability pressures might lead to suboptimal outcomes. Citizens’ 
demands for accountability are like clockwork and policymakers seek to avoid taking the 
blame when things go wrong and seek credit when things go right. The public may have 
different interpretations of the wisdom of employing vague verbiage or precise 
probabilities than politicians, precisely because political actors understand that 
accountability means accepting more blame for being precise than being vague. 
Can Accountability Help Overcome Cognitive Interference Effects? 
 People are frequently blindsided by change. Can holding them accountable for 
their beliefs make them more sensitive to change? Perceptual interference has received 
almost zero attention from judgment and decision-making scholars. Given the robustness 
of the other heuristics and biases mentioned earlier, we might expect cognitive 
interference effects when people are integrating information that points to incremental 
change. Can these cognitive interference effects be overcome with additional deliberate 
processing spurred by being held accountable? Scholars have successfully debiased 
hindsight effects and status quo bias with strategies such as “considering the opposite” 
(Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Others 
have shown that holding subjects accountable for their judgments has also led to a similar 
debiasing effect (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987).  
Roadmap 
In this dissertation, I set out to study the boundary conditions on accountability 
effects. Specifically, in a series of four studies I set out to examine accountability effects 
on participants’ performance in highly stochastic and politically-charged environments. I 
attempt to answer the following questions: Can accountability spur subjects to distinguish 
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more reliably between highly unpredictable environments and predictable ones, thereby 
reducing the incidence of both Type 1 and Type 2 errors? Can holding people 
accountable improve their decision-making on politically-charged issues or boost their 
accuracy in forecasting geopolitical outcomes? Finally, which individual differences 
predict higher performance in different accountability schemes?  
Stochastic Settings 
In Study 1, subjects were put in charge of defensive emplacements inside a 
fictional city divided into quadrants. Choosing the correct quadrant would have 
successfully prevented an attack on the city, while choosing the incorrect quadrant led to 
a failed defense. Subjects were randomly assigned to complete this task under two 
different stochastic conditions. Across these environments, quadrants were targeted for 
attack in one of three ways: (a) attacks were distributed at random across all four 
quadrants; (b) one quadrant was randomly selected to be targeted 60% of the time, while 
the remaining 40% of attacks were distributed randomly across the remaining quadrants; 
or (c) one quadrant was randomly selected to be targeted 40% of the time, while the 
remaining 60% of attacks were distributed randomly across the remaining quadrants. 
Subjects received accurate feedback after each trial and were (a) held accountable for 
providing a rationale for their decision strategy (process accountability); (b) held 
accountable for the total number of successful defenses (outcome accountability); or (c) 
not held accountable at all.    
Politically-Charged Settings 
 9 
In Study 2, two sets of subjects were asked about a potential terrorist attack and 
its aftermath. The first set of subjects included individuals who previously worked in 
public policy at the local, state, or federal level. Subjects received information about a 
possible attack and then made a choice of whether to convey that information with either 
verbal or numeric probabilities. They were then asked whether they would ground all air 
traffic in light of the threat information and how justified they felt in taking action. They 
then learned of the outcome of their action and were again asked how justified they felt in 
taking action.  
A second set of subjects were asked about the same potential terrorist attack. They 
judged the performance of policymakers who chose to make their warnings as either 
verbal or numeric probabilities. They were then asked to judge policymakers a second 
time after learning of the outcomes of the action taken. 
In Study 3, subjects were asked to make a value-neutral but politically-charged 
public policy choice: whether they would institute a gun control policy, implement an 
environmental cleanup plan, or fund a hospital.  Subjects were either held accountable for 
providing a rationale or were not. 
Geopolitical Forecasting and Belief Updating 
In Study 4, subjects were asked to make predictions about an upcoming 
referendum on state independence, either starting from high information certainty (a 
strong prior) or low information certainty (a weak prior). In the first part of this study, 
subjects were simply asked to make forecasts. In the second part of this study, subjects 
were tested on whether holding them accountable would help them make optimally 
Bayesian judgments.  
 10 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Accountability Effects on the Recognition of Randomness and Error Commission 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Decision errors occur when people take actions that they should not, or fail to take 
actions that they should.  Errors of the first type – errors of commission – are especially 
common in stochastic environments, resulting in volatile decision strategies that “chase” 
patterns that do not exist. On the flipside, errors of the second type – errors of omission – 
tend to occur when patterns in the environment are both meaningful and valid, but people 
fail to recognize them. We examined whether holding subjects accountable for process or 
outcome criteria improves performance in environments of varying randomness. Subjects 
were asked to choose the correct quadrant to defend on a map of a fictional city, a task 
inspired by the London Blitz during World War II. Process accountable subjects were 
less likely to make errors of commission in unpredictable environments while outcome 
accountable subjects were more likely to commit errors of omission in predictable ones. 
Those accountable for process searched for the right solution when it existed, but 
continued searching for the right solution even when one did not exist. Process 
accountability is not a one-size-fits-all intervention for performance improvement: the 
right kind of accountability hinges on recognizing the operational environment in which 
the task is situated. Additionally, given the minimalist nature of the accountability 
intervention in this study, the effects observed are likely to be the lower-bound on 
accountability’s effects on error reduction. 
 
Keywords: process, outcome, accountability, stochastic 
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Introduction 
 
Decision-makers often operate in dynamic environments such as financial 
markets, battlefields, and operating rooms (Hastie, 2001). Even though past research has 
thoroughly documented the conditions under which decision-makers tend to deviate from 
rational utility maximization (Edwards, 1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Simon, 1959), scholars in judgment and decision-making remain at 
odds over whether decision-makers are better served by intuitive or deliberate thinking 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer 
& Todd, 1999; Gilovich & Griffin, 2010; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Klein, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
A similar debate exists over what kinds of accountability systems, if any, can 
enable higher quality decisions and more accurate judgments. In general, accountability 
systems are seen as increasing cognitive demand on subjects and spurring them to use 
more deliberate processing when tackling consequential tasks (Patil, Vieider, & Tetlock, 
2014).  Zooming out, accountability systems, at their core, dictate who must answer to 
whom and for what (Frink & Klimoski, 1998, 2004; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
Accountability has been proposed as a way to improve judgment and decision-making in 
many fields, including human resources, education, accounting, corporate governance, 
and as a cognitive cure for groupthink (Brennan, Solomon, Brennan, & Solomon, 2008; 
Chubb & Moe, 1988; Hall et al., 2003; Kroon, Hart, & Van Kreveld, 1991; Peecher, 
Solomon, & Trotman, 2013).  
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Holding subjects accountable for their judgments has been shown to reduce 
recency bias and overconfidence (Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock & Kim, 1987), but 
accountability can also exacerbate biases if the account takers’ views are known to be 
biased (Tetlock, 1992). The distinction between process accountability systems (i.e., 
justifying how you achieved outcomes) and outcome accountability systems (i.e., being 
evaluated solely on goal achievement) and the relative merits of the two is a source of 
debate (Patil et al., 2014; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). Scholars have examined the question of 
whether incentivizing proper thinking or outcomes more reliably improves task 
performance (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson & Nye, 1992; Simonson & Staw, 
1992). Some studies provide evidence to suggest that process accountability is superior 
(Ashton, 1992; De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Hagafors & Brehmer, 
1983), while others demonstrate the negative impact of focusing on outcomes (Arkes, 
Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), 
and some show outcome accountability to be superior (Slaughter, Bagger, & Li, 2006).  
Antecedent conditions determine when we should expect intuitive judgments to 
outperform deliberate thinking or when we should expect to observe no difference in 
decision-quality (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 
2011). In a similar fashion, the boundary conditions for where and when to expect those 
accountable for process to outperform those accountable for outcomes and vice versa can 
be determined by the task environment and type (De Langhe, van Osselaer, & Wierenga, 
2011). Two central features, one of the decision environment and the other of the 
decision task, are likely to impact the effectiveness of process versus outcome 
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accountability systems: 1) the predictability of the environment and 2) the cost functions 
associated with errors of omission and commission, respectively.   
Environmental Validity and Task Predictability 
 
Whether decision-makers can successfully navigate environments with intuition 
depends on the predictability of the environment (i.e., cue validity) and opportunities to 
learn from regular, meaningful feedback (Arkes, 2001; Goodman, Wood, & Chen, 2011; 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009). The degree of environmental randomness faced varies 
widely, from low validity environments such as publicly traded equity markets (Malkiel, 
1995, 1999; Taleb, 2005) to high validity environments such as piloting and firefighting 
(Klein, 2008; Phillips, Klein, & Sieck, 2004). Correctly sizing up the task environment is 
central to good judgment. People generally misperceive random processes, including 
characterizing random sequences as non-random due to the presence of clusters (people 
assume that random sequences will exhibit both local and global randomness) (Hahn & 
Warren, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974; Tune, 1964; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 
1973) and seeing patterns where they don’t actually exist (Edwards, 1956; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008). Incorrectly identifying the validity of the task environment can lead to 
excessive volatility of judgments and decisions (Bondt & Thaler, 1985; De Bondt & 
Thaler, 1994; Odean, 1998) and inadequate calibration (both over-confidence and under-
confidence) (Massey & Wu, 2005).   
How can accountability systems help people navigate these task environments? 
The recommendations from the literature paint a complicated picture. Some researchers 
have found that intuitive processing led to superior performance even in a task 
environment with very complex variable relationships (Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 
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1987; Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). Other 
researchers have found that intuition leads to flawed judgments, such as imperfectly 
assessing covariation (Arkes, 1981, 1991; Arkes et al., 1986).  
One way forward can be found in the work of De Langhe et al. (2011) who found 
that process accountability enabled higher quality judgments when the task was elemental 
– that is, when the cue-outcome relationship was linear (additive). In elemental tasks, 
properly attending to the individual cues would result in a more accurate judgment. 
However, when the task was configural – that is, when the cue-outcome structure is 
interactive (multiplicative) – those in the outcome accountability condition were more 
accurate. It follows that in high validity environments, attending to the task specifics is 
likely to lead to more accurate judgments as people are more quickly to be able to pick up 
on the real patterns that exist in the environment. Depending on the how the system is set 
up, process accountability can push subjects to focus attention on specifics (or concrete 
processing), as opposed to outcome accountability, which typically enable holistic 
assessments (or abstract processing) (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  
However, depending on environmental validity, more specific thinking is not 
always helpful. In low validity environments, activating deliberate modes of thought can 
lead to excessive search for non-existent patterns, reading meaning into meaningless 
patterns such as in the “hot hand” fallacy, misperception of otherwise random processes 
such as the “illusion of control,” and decisional deliberation beyond the point of 
diminishing returns (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Langer, 1975, 1977; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1971). Decisions in stochastic environments may be systematically biased, 
as some researchers have demonstrated a tendency to use short-run contrarian strategies 
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(i.e., believing the next event must be different from the last) when randomness is 
perceived to be high (Tyszka, Zielonka, Dacey, & Sawicki, 2008) or investing too much 
or too little as compared to the predictions of the utility maximization model (Bostian, 
Holt, & Smith, 2008; Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000).  
Accountability Dictates Exist on a Specificity Continuum  
 
How specific or ambiguous should agents expect accountability rules to be? The 
dictates of process and outcome accountability systems vary from highly ambiguous to 
highly specific in a manner similar to the validity of the environments in which they are 
designed to operate (Bovens et al., 2014). Ultimately, the level of specificity in an 
accountability system is likely correlated with the regularity of the task environment. At 
one end, satisfying accountability system dictates may require fulfilling very specific 
criteria, and on the other end, ambiguous criteria. In an orderly and linear environment, 
systemic behavior can be understood to the point that a derived process optimally 
describes what is going on within the system. Outperforming a well-crafted process 
accountability regime in this environment becomes impossible.  
However, volatile environments are precisely the kind of environment where 
high-stakes decisions are made. Decision-makers, such as military officers during 
wartime or officials in charge of monetary policy during financial crises, often find 
themselves in chaotic environments where the right answer isn’t known and an exact 
decision process cannot be specified. In this case, the means of achieving improved 
performance is ambiguous and decision-makers can only be offered a few specific 
(inexact) process guidelines. The rest must be improved or left to the discretion of the 
individual decision-maker. And in extreme cases, process accountability systems may 
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include no specific process guidelines at all, just guidance that you should use your best 
judgment and be ready to explain that process later. Similarly, outcome accountability 
dictates can be well-defined or ambiguous. Outcome goals could include specific goals to 
work towards, or ill-defined goals exemplified by the generic phrases “be successful” and 
“do your best”.  
 
Error-Balancing, Error Aversion, and Differing Predictions for Outcome and Process 
Accountability 
 
Drawing on logical insights from signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966), 
a feature of decision-making in non-deterministic environments is that errors are dual-
sided, in that they can result from both omission and commission. Whether mistakes 
arising from not taking an action versus taking an action are worse depends on the 
associated cost-functions, although the psychological literature points to a distinct 
omission bias where people favor mistakes from not taking an action over those that arise 
from taking one (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1995). The literature on 
error-balancing is underdeveloped and the question of whether accountability systems 
can experimentally enable balancing behavior is unexplored, especially within the 
context of unpredictable vs. predictable environments (Camerer, 1987; Hollnagel, 2000; 
Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).  
When should we expect over-commitment to failed decision strategies or under-
commitment to promising ones? In general, we should expect systematic risk avoidance 
(and thus under-commitment and excessively shifting strategies) in unpredictable 
environments rooted in ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). However, this general risk 
avoidance may not hold, to the extent that specific kinds of accountability systems can 
 17 
lead subjects to erroneously think that the environment is more or less predictable than in 
reality. For example, depending on how the system is set up, process accountability can 
lead to excessive focus on task sub-components, which can impair recognition of a low 
validity environment and thus set up pathways to errors of commission (over-
commitment). Outcome accountability can lead to inadequate attention to variable 
relationships in high validity environments, leading to errors of omission (under-
commitment).  
Previous work showed that process accountability tended to increase vigilance in 
information processing and selection of the most defensible decision strategy (Tetlock, 
1983a, 1985; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; Zhang & Mittal, 2005). Thus, process 
accountability should push subjects to search more attentively for the right solution when 
it exists. Other streams of research, conducted by de Langhe and colleagues (2011), show 
that process accountability increases epistemic motivation (search for answers or truth), 
which promotes effortful information processing The result is a more consistent approach 
to making decisions and choices—something that is beneficial when patterns in the 
environment are consistent.  
However, the risk here is that process accountable subjects continue the search 
long after it has proven to be fruitless—no proper decision rule exists for totally random 
environments—thereby leading to errors of commission. Past work has shown that 
process accountability leads to more information processing, including consideration of 
irrelevant evidence (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1995). Per Patil et al. (2016), the decision 
rule was inadequate in the excessive conformity risk condition, which led to process 
accountability degrading task performance. While the task was more predictable, there 
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existed better decision rules to get to the right answer, which subjects didn’t seek out. 
Previous work has also shown that process accountability tends to lead to higher levels of 
conformity to existing decision rules and systems, weighing information in a rule-based 
fashion (Chang et al., 2017; de Langhe et al., 2011). Similarly, in a low validity 
environment – that is, navigating a more difficult task environment – we should expect 
process to degrade performance because no amount of rule-seeking will get the subject 
closer to the right answer. The previously beneficial conformity to adequate rules thus 
becomes a detrimental kind of judgmental consistency (Chang et al., 2017). Thus, it 
follows that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Process accountability degrades task performance in low validity 
environments but improves performance in high validity ones, when compared to 
no accountability and outcome accountability.  
A flipside risk exists for outcome accountable subjects whose attentional focus is 
on their final score. Previous work has shown that outcome accountable subjects were 
less likely to use consistent rules for their choices and decisions, likely due to a focus on 
the end results as opposed to how to get to the end result (de Langhe et al., 2011).  
Certainly, a focus on outcomes could lead to behavior to maximize scores when an 
adequate decision rule exists. Thus, in a high validity environment, where the task is 
more predictable, outcome accountable subjects should identify a real pattern more 
quickly. However, these subjects may still be tempted to continue searching for patterns 
that do not exist. Because outcome accountability tends to generate “deviation” errors, 
that is, resisting to conform to previously discovered adequate decision processes, we 
would expect these subjects to chase a higher score even when being more conservative 
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would be a better course of action (Patil et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2017). Conversely, 
outcome accountable subjects concerned about scores would likely be more protective of 
them in a random world, thus reducing the risk of commission errors in low validity 
environments. By focusing on the score and noticing that no amount of switching or 
searching for a pattern is helping to increase it, outcome accountability might help 
subjects recognize randomness more quickly. Thus, it follows that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Outcome accountability degrades performance in high validity 
environments but enhances performance in low validity ones, when compared to 
no accountability and process accountability.    
The concept of psychological safety also potentially illuminates the relationship 
between accountability systems and error propensities (Edmondson, 1999, 2002). 
Psychological safety is the degree to which people perceive their environment as enabling 
interpersonal risk-taking (Edmondson, Kramer, & Cook, 2004). Process accountability 
guidelines can feel psychologically safe in low validity environments because at least it 
feels possible to satisfy the requirements of the process system (as it is difficult to 
perform well in low validity environments). Outcome accountability in low validity 
environments can be viewed as arbitrary and capricious, as the level of effort expended is 
not tightly coupled with achieving better outcomes. We should expect more errors of 
commission by process accountable subjects in low validity environments, as they may 
also feel psychologically safer to take action because process inputs are controllable. 
Thus, it follows that: 
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Hypothesis 1b: Process-accountable subjects are more likely to make errors of 
commission in low validity environments but not in high validity ones, when 
compared to non-accountable and outcome accountable subjects.   
 
Hypothesis 2b: Outcome-accountable subjects are more likely to make errors of 
commission in high validity environments but not in low validity ones, when 
compared to non-accountable and process accountable subjects. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Both errors of omission and commission are negatively related to 
task performance. 
 
 
Accountability, Learning, and Regulatory Focus 
 
What else drives the differences in performance between outcome accountable 
and process accountable agents? Results from a large-scale year-long field experiment 
examining accountability and learning found evidence to support outcome accountability 
as being more conducive to long-term learning and process accountability as less so 
(Chang et. al., 2017). Following March’s (1991) distinction between exploration and 
exploitation, the results of previous research show that learning within process 
accountability led to improvements in execution of the process, while learning within 
outcome accountability led to improved overall performance beyond the process baseline. 
Focusing on learning specifically helps us better understand the relationship between 
learning and accountability in highly predictable vs. low predictability task environments, 
and also whether subjects are better able to balance error propensities over time. This has 
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been similarly investigated within the multiple-cue probability learning experimental 
paradigm (although the current experiment differs in that it has only one cue) (Hammond 
& Summers, 1965; Hammond, Summers, & Deane, 1973; Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 
1964).  
Another body of literature that illuminates how this learning potentially occurs is 
the work on regulatory focus, which builds on the aforementioned work on psychological 
safety (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).  Process accountable agents, adopting a prevention 
mindset, are less likely to identify environmental randomness because they are fully 
engaged in process execution. Thus, over time, process accountable agents are unlikely to 
transcend the limitations of the process for which they are responsible and will be slower 
to identify that the environment in which they are operating is not suitable for blindly 
following process dictates. In contrast, outcome accountable agents, for which the nature 
of the effort-outcome coupling is front and center, will likely adopt a promotion-focused 
mindset, and are more likely to quickly understand the extent to which environmental 
randomness influences preferred outcomes. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: Outcome accountable agents will learn to commit fewer errors of 
commission in low validity environments and process accountable agents will 
learn to commit fewer errors of omission in high validity environments.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the full moderated-mediation model for this study. 
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Figure 1. Model of how error propensity and environmental validity moderate 
accountability effects on task performance. The predictability of the task environment 
moderates the effects of accountability on task performance. 
 
 
Method 
 
Optimal Strategies for Solving the Task “London Quadrants” 
 
In a series of studies, subjects completed a custom-designed task (referred to as 
“London Quadrants”) inspired by the London Blitz of World War II when Nazi Germany 
attempted to force the United Kingdom to capitulate by attacking population centers. A 
case study after the war revealed that many of the reported actions taken by British 
citizens—who naturally assumed the Germans were purposefully targeting parts of the 
city—turned out to be overreactions to randomness. The German Luftwaffe aircraft were 
simply targeting the center of London, not specific landmarks (Clarke, 1946).  
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Subjects received instructions for how to complete the task and then were shown 
a map of the fictional city, Lemon, split into quadrants. They were told that their task was 
to defend the city from the country of Grapes by correctly predicting which quadrant was 
going to be targeted next. A correct prediction would negate an attack from the Grape air 
force. For more screenshots, see the Methodological Appendix.1 Following task 
completion, subjects answered a survey which captured the following individual 
differences variables: actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition, and the Big 5 
factors (conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to experiences, extroversion, and 
agreeableness). See the Methodological Appendix for the full scales used. 
 
Figure 2. Map of city of Lemon in the London Quadrants task. Subjects saw a version of 
a fictional city named Lemon attacked by the country of Grapes. 
 
Tracking Task Performance 
 
 Subjects were then instructed in how their performance on the London Quadrants 
task would be scored. Subjects were asked to make predictions for 60 trials. If they 
                                                
1 Game located at: www.gjptraining.org/sona/game/start, see the methodological appendix for screenshots; 
http://lemon-game.herokuapp.com/ 
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successfully defended a quadrant via a correct prediction, they would be awarded points. 
If they were unsuccessful, points would be deducted. Once they chose a quadrant to 
defend, switching to another quadrant on a subsequent trial would incur a cost. Event 
point values were as follows: Successful Defense (S) = +2; Unsuccessful Defense (U) =  
-1; Cost of Switching (CoS) = -0.5. Assuming no switches, subjects could achieve a 
maximum possible score of 120; assuming maximal switching and unsuccessful 
defensive emplacements, subjects could achieve the worst possible score of -90. 
 
 
Table 1 
  
Possible Scores on London Quadrants Task 
Scenario Total score 
Best outcome (100% success) | no switching 60*(2) = 120 
Best outcome | switching 50% of the time 60*(2) – 30*(-0.5) = 105 
Best outcome | switching 100% of the time 60*(2) – 60*(-0.5) = 90 
Worst outcome (0% success) | switching 50% of the time 60(-1) – 30*(-0.5) = -75 
Worst outcome | switching 100% of the time 60(-0.5) + -1*(60) = -90 
 
A normatively-justified strategy for choosing which quadrant to defend is arrived 
at by calculating the expected value of each action on each trial, and selecting the action 
with the highest expected value. The challenge is that subjects do not know the 
probabilities that are required to make the expected value calculation. Thus, as part of this 
process, an optimal strategy in the London Quadrants task would require subjects to 
derive the probabilities of a successful defense in each quadrant via Bayesian inference. 
Once the expected values of defending each quadrant are known, a player’s optimal 
strategy is determined by the balance of costs and benefits associated with implementing 
each plausible defense. Choosing to switch requires that the expected value of switching 
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be greater than the expected value of staying in the same quadrant and vice versa for 
staying in the same quadrant.  
Thus, a player should choose to switch quadrants if and only if the expected value 
of switching is greater than the expected value of remaining in the same quadrant as the 
previous trial: 2𝑝 𝑆|𝑥& = 𝑥&() − 	𝑝 𝑈|𝑥& = 𝑥&() + 	𝑆𝐶 > 	𝑚𝑎𝑥 2𝑝 𝑆|𝑥& ≠ 𝑥&() −	𝑝 𝑈|𝑥& ≠ 𝑥&() , 
 
Where x = (1,2,3,4) represents the quadrant in which a subject has stationed his or her 
defense on trial i. 
 
Or more simply: max(EV | Switch) + Cost(Switch) > EV | No Switch 
 
Coming Up With A Generally Successful Strategy 
Let 𝑡& be a random variable that represents the change in score in trial 𝑖, and let T 
be a random variable representing the total score of a participant for the entirety of the 
game.  
𝑇 = 	 𝑡&67&8)  
 
For a random variable 𝑋, we let 𝐸 𝑋  represent its expected value, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑋 = 	 [𝜎 𝑋 ]@ 
represent its variance, and 𝜎(𝑋) represent its standard deviation. We further let 𝑃(𝑆&|𝐺) 
represent the probability that trial 𝑖 generates a success (𝑆&), given a participant uses 
strategy 𝐺.  
Ignoring switching costs, the expected value of 𝑡& given strategy 𝐺 is as follows:    𝐸 𝑡& = 	𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1 	= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1	 
Thus, the expected value of a given trial is positive if 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 > )H	. 
Again ignoring switching costs, the variance of 𝑡& is given by: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 	𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @	
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= 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 4 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 1 − 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1 @		= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 + 1 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @ + 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1 =	9 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @ + 6 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 + 4 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 −	 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺  = 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 	9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @ 
 
However, if the quadrant chosen in trial 𝑖 is different from the quadrant in trial 𝑖 − 1 for 
all i, then the participant also loses points for switching: 𝐸 𝑡& = 	𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ (1.5) + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1.5 	= 3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5	 
 
The variance of 𝑡&, given switching on all trials, is: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 	𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @	= 	 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 − 3	𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5 @	= 2.25 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @ + 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 2.25	= 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @	
 
What if the attacks are randomly distributed amongst quadrants?  
 
When the environment is random (i.e., each quadrant has the same probability of being 
attacked), no matter what the strategy is, 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺) = )N. So, it follows that the expected 
value, given no switching, is: 
𝐸 𝑡& = 	3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1	 = −14 = −0.25 
The variance, given no switching, is: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 	𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @	= 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 	9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @	= 3616	−	 916 = 2716 	= 1.69 
 
Given switching, the expected value is: 
 𝐸 𝑡& = 	3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5	 = 	−34 = −0.75 
The variance, given a switch, is: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡& = 	𝐸 𝑡&@ − 𝐸 𝑡& @ = 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2.25 − 3	𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5 @	= 6𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 9𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 @	
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= 2416 −	 916 	= 1516 = 	0.9375	
 
Over the entire length of the task, the best strategy (G) in a random environment, is 
simply to pick a quadrant and stick to it, because other strategies incur switching costs 
while getting no higher chances of success. So, we will restrict our attention to this case.  
The expected score using the no-switch strategy is: 
𝐸[𝑡] = 	𝐸[ 𝑡&]67&8) 	
= 	 𝐸 𝑡&67&8) 	= 60 ∗ 𝐸 𝑡& 	= −15	 
 
The variance and standard deviation are: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇) = 	𝑉𝑎𝑟[ 𝑡&]67&8) 	= 	 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡&67&8) 	= 60 ∗ 1.69	= 4054 = 	101.25	𝜎 𝑇 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑡 	= 10.06	
 
We can approximate the score distribution using a normal random variable with expected 
value of −15 and standard deviation 10.06. 
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Figure 3. Expected total score distribution in a random environment. Expected scores for 
a subject choosing one quadrant at random and not switching out of that quadrant.  
 
 
 
What if the attacks are not randomly distributed?  
 
What is the optimal strategy if the attacks are not randomly distributed? There are 
many ways in which the quadrants can be targeted, but in a non-random scenario, one or 
more quadrants will be targeted at rates higher than chance. In the case where a higher-
weighted quadrant has a probability of being targeted p = 0.6, and the remaining 
quadrants are independently targeted with a cumulative probability of p = 0.4 (i.e., 40% 
of the time, one of the three lower-weighted quadrants is targeted at random), the 
expected value of protecting the higher-weighted quadrant is: 𝐸 𝑡& = 	3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1		= 0.8	
 
The expected value of choosing one of the lower-weighted quadrants is thus: 
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𝐸 𝑡& = 	𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 2 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1  = 	3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1	= − 915 = 	−0.6 
 
Likewise, the expected value of switching to the higher-weighted (i.e., the normatively 
correct) quadrant is: 
 𝐸 𝑡& = 	𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 1.5 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1.5  = 	3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5	= 0.3 
Finally, the expected value of switching to one of the lower-weighted quadrants is: 
 𝐸 𝑡& = 	𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ 1.5 + 1 − 𝑃 𝑆& 𝐺 ∗ −1.5  = 	3𝑝 𝑆& 𝐺 − 1.5	= −1.1 
 
What strategy should be employed over the course of the task in a non-random 
environment? 
 
The most straightforward strategy for maximizing the total score is to switch to 
the most frequently targeted quadrant and stay there. Even so, the “choose one quadrant 
and never switch” strategy still has the expected value: 
𝐸[𝑡] = 	𝐸[ 𝑡&]67&8) 	= 0.25 ∗ 60 ∗ 0.8 + 0.75 ∗ 60 ∗ −0.6 	= −15	
 
In this strategy, the variance of total score is significantly higher – either you 
initially choose the higher-weighted quadrant or you do not.  
Strategies from reinforcement learning 
The LQ task can be framed as a reinforcement learning problem (e.g., a multi-
armed bandit). Bandit problems model an agent simultaneously trying to acquire new 
knowledge (exploration) while optimizing decisions based on existing knowledge 
(exploitation). The agent attempts to balance these competing priorities to maximize the 
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total value attained over time. On each trial 𝑖 ∈ 1, 2, … , 60 , the player can take one of 
four actions (e.g., choosing to protect one of the four quadrants). To review, if the player 
chooses the same quadrant as they did in the previous trial (or if 𝑖 = 1), then they receive 
+2 if that quadrant is attacked, and receive -1 if another quadrant is attacked. If they 
switch to another quadrant, they get a reward of 1.5 if the chosen quadrant is attacked and 
receive -1.5 otherwise. In the language of reinforcement learning, the goal is to maximize 
the sum of all the rewards over time received by the agent. On trial 𝑖, suppose the player 
has seen 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()	strikes against quadrants 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively, where 𝑎&() 	+ 𝑏&() +		𝑐&() +	𝑑&() = 𝑖 − 1. Also suppose the player is at quadrant 𝑞&(). This 
state can be represented by a quintet 𝑞&(), 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() . Assuming the attacked 
quadrants are independent given the true generating distribution, no further knowledge 
can be gained from the specific order of attacks, and this state contains all the information 
needed to make a choice regarding the next trial.  
Without any loss of generality, suppose the agent is currently in quadrant 1. The 
value (that is, the expected value over the remaining rounds) of staying is: 
 𝐸 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	1	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()  = 	𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	1	 	(1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&())) ∗ 2+ 	𝑝(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	2	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() 𝐸 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&() + 1, 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()− 1+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	3	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() 𝐸 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&() + 1, 𝑑&()− 1+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	4	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() (𝐸 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() + 1− 1)	 	 
Likewise, the value of choosing quadrant 2 can be calculated as: 𝐸 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	2	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()  
 31 
= 	𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	2	 	(1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&())) ∗ 𝐸( 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()+ 1.5+ 	𝑝(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	1	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() 𝐸 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&() + 1, 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()− 1.5+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	3	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() 𝐸 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&() + 1, 𝑑&()− 1.5+ 𝑝 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡	𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	4	 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() (𝐸 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() + 1− 1.5)	 
 
The value of choosing quadrants 3 and 4 can be calculated similarly. Since the agent is 
trying to choose so as to maximize value, they will take the quadrant that has the highest 
value. This means the value of 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&()  is given by: 𝑉 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() = maxe 𝑉(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡	𝑞	| 1, 𝑎&(), 𝑏&(), 𝑐&(), 𝑑&() ) 
Note that the value of all trials where 𝑡 > 60 is 0, because the game is over, and that the 
value of any state at time 𝑡	depends only on the value of states at time 𝑡 + 1. To review, 
the total value across trials is:  
𝑅 = 	 𝑟𝑡g867h8)  
 
Thus, the expected total reward from following strategy G is 𝐸 𝑅(𝐺, 𝑋) = 	 2 ∗ 𝑝(h 𝑋h = 𝐴h) − 𝑝 𝑋h	 ≠ 𝐴h − 	0.5 ∗ (𝐴h 	≠ 	𝐴h) 
 
Table 2  
 
Reinforcement Learning Model Derived Optimal Behavior in London Quadrants Task 
Scenario Model Optimal Behavior 𝐸 𝑅(𝐺, 𝑋)  
1 pi = 0.25, i = 1,2,3,4 Choose any 
quadrant and do not 
move 
-15 
2 p1 = 0.6, pi = 
(0.4/3), 1,2,3,4 
Choose quadrant i = 
1 and do not move 
78 
3 p1 = 0.4, pi = 
(0.6/3), 1,2,3,4 
Choose quadrant i = 
1 and do not move 
48 
 
The probabilities involved can be calculated directly using Bayesian reasoning. This 
means we can work backwards from 𝑡 = 60 and explicitly calculate the value of each 
 32 
state, as well as the value of choosing a given action given a state. Then, we can choose 
the action at each step that maximizes expected value. However, this behavior is only 
possible if the agent knows the model (i.e., the true distribution of attacks).  
 
What if the distribution of attacks is unknown? 
 
If model (pi , i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is unknown, what would constitute optimal behavior (i.e., 
how should subjects behave in the experiment)? Learning the model (pi , i = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
given a history of outcomes (e.g., successes and predictions), ht = (a1, x1, a2, x1, …, at, xt) 
where (x1, …, xt) is a sample from model (pi) can be defined as: 
𝑍&h = 	 𝐼(𝑥𝑗 = 𝑖)hm8) , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4 
the number of attacks observed in quadrant i after t trials 
 𝑍&h = 𝑍)h, 𝑍@h, 𝑍Hh, 𝑍Nh ~	𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑡m𝑝)𝑝@𝑝H𝑝N) 
where  𝑧&hN&8) = 𝑡 
 
The challenge for subjects is to determine the distribution of probabilities across the 
quadrants  (𝑝)𝑝@𝑝H𝑝N). As previously noted, the probabilities can be calculated via 
Bayesian inference, which gives rise to the optimal way of approaching LQ. The 
Bayesian inference model allows us to simplify the problem into a two-choice model: 
stay or switch. We can thus calculate the Value of Switching (VoS) and derive an optimal 
solution by calculating when VoS is > or < the value of choosing the same quadrant. 
VoS = 𝐸 𝑅(𝐺&, 𝑋) − 	𝐸 𝑅(𝐺&, 𝑋)  
If VoS > 0.5 à at+1 = j 
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Now, let a successful trial be defined as S and an unsuccessful trial be defined as U, 
switching quadrants designated as Sw and staying as St. Thus: 
1.5*P(S|Sw) - 1.5*P(U|Sw) > 2*P(S|St) - P(U|St)  
This Bayesian model simplifies to:  
= 1.5*P(S|Sw) - 1.5*(1-P(U|Sw)) > 2*P(S|St) - (1-P(S|St)) 
= 1.5(2*P(S|Sw) - 1) > 3*P(S|St) - 1 
= 3*P(S|Sw) - 1.5 > 3*P(S|Sw) - 1 
= 3*P(S|Sw) - 3*P(S|St) > 0.5 
= P(S|Sw) - P(S|St) > 1/6 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Graph depicting when subjects should stay or switch according to Bayes 
Theorem. The red line depicts when the value of switching is equal to 0.167 and the blue 
line represents the probability of a successful defense given a switch.  
 
 
Figure 4 shows that a subject should switch quadrants when the probability of success is 
greater than 0.58 and stay if the probability is less than that.  
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The Bayesian model justifies the following strategy:  
 
1. Start by randomly choosing a quadrant 
2. Identify which quadrant, if any, is the best one to protect 
3. Infer a rule, if any, for how quadrants are attacked 
4. Switch to that quadrant if the probability of that quadrant being hit is more than 
58% 
5. If you cannot identify the higher-weighted quadrant (or if there is none), then stay 
with the quadrant you are currently in. 
Beyond taking into account simple expected value calculations, there are several 
potential normative strategies that can be employed to perform well on the LQ task, 
depending on certain assumptions regarding the distribution of attacks and the 
independence or dependence of events from trial-to-trial. For example, Figures 5 and 6 
depict dependent models, where the last attacked quadrant determines the next attacked 
quadrant. 
 
 
Figure 5. London Quadrants general conditional model. Future attacks could be 
determined by what happened immediately before.  
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Figure 6. London Quadrants specific conditional model. In this case, if quadrant A was 
attacked first, then the order of subsequent attacks is B, C, D and then back to A. 
 
There are a large number of potential conditional models. The above models were 
highlighted to show two possibilities—but it is outside the scope of this experiment to 
enumerate all of the possible alternative strategies, given assumptions of conditionality. 
For the purposes of the experiment, the Bayesian inference model is the optimal model 
given an assumption of independence (subjects were not told of any normative 
information or of a model to follow).  
 
Procedure and Subjects 
The study was conducted in two parts. Both experiments, 1a and 1b, were 2 
(random vs. non-random environment) x 3 (no accountability, process accountability, 
outcome accountability) factorial design. Subjects were randomly assigned one of the six 
conditions. In Experiment 1a (N=178), subjects were recruited by a university behavioral 
lab and consisted mostly of undergraduates and some community members. Over 90% of 
the subjects were between the ages of 18-24. The sample was 66% female and 40% 
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Caucasian. In Experiment 1b (N=106), subjects were also recruited by the university 
behavioral lab. Over 97% of subjects were between the ages of 18-24. The sample was 
56% female and 57% Caucasian. 
 
Materials 
Subjects utilized a custom-designed web interface to complete the task. Each 
subject completed the task of choosing the correct quadrant over sixty trials after 
receiving a thorough set of instructions. In the random condition, each quadrant had an 
equal chance of being attacked on each trial. In the non-random condition, one quadrant 
was randomly selected to be the higher weighted quadrant, which meant that it had an 
increased likelihood of being attacked. In all cases, the complementary cumulative 
probability was allocated to the remaining quadrants such that each of the remaining 
quadrants had an equal probability of being attacked. In Experiment 1a, the higher-
weighted quadrant was attacked 60% of the time, with the remaining quadrants being 
randomly targeted the remaining 40% of the time. In Experiment 1b, the higher-weighted 
quadrant was attacked 40% of the time, with the remaining quadrants being randomly 
targeted the remaining 60% of the time. To review, subjects received 2 points for 
correctly choosing which quadrant was going to be attacked next, -1 point for 
unsuccessful choices, and switching quadrants cost subjects 0.5 point. Subjects were 
assigned to one of three accountability conditions: no accountability, process 
accountability, and outcome accountability. Depending on the condition they were 
assigned to, subjects saw the following language to describe the need to justify their 
choice of quadrants. 
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Table 3 
  
Accountability Manipulation Descriptions for Experiments 
Condition Manipulation Language 
Control 
 
“Please do the best that you can. You will have the opportunity to take 
notes and put your notes into a text box. You will not be evaluated on 
your final score nor on the reasoning that you put in the text box. The 
notes are for your benefit only. Your full completion of the task and 
subsequent survey is the only requirement for this study.” 
 
Process 
 
“You will be evaluated based upon your rationale for how you made 
the decision to protect each quadrant.  Before you make a decision 
regarding the quadrant to protect on each trial, you must write your 
rationale for the decision in the provided text box. An expert evaluator 
trained by the experimental staff will award you points for each of 
your explanations. You will be evaluated on the quality of your 
explanations only. Your final score will not impact your compensation 
at all. You will be awarded a bonus of up to $12 for the quality of your 
explanations.”  
 
Outcome “You will be evaluated solely on your final score. Your goal is to 
achieve the highest positive score possible. Your score will determine 
how much bonus compensation you receive. For each point you score, 
you will be awarded $0.10 for a total possible bonus payout of $12. 
You can take notes in the provided text box. Your notes will NOT be 
read by the experimenter. The notes are for your benefit only.” 
  
  
 
Results 
Experiment 1a 
 Subjects in Experiment 1a experienced completely random targeting of quadrants, 
or one quadrant targeted 60% of the time and the remaining 40% of attacks randomly 
distributed amongst the remaining three quadrants. We first sought to determine whether 
there were significant differences in scores between accountability and validity 
conditions.  
The results from Experiment 1a, specifically final scores and frequency of 
switches, were consistent with the predicted direction of effects per Hypotheses1a, 1b, 
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2a, and 2b; however, the differences between conditions were not significant. Table 4 
shows that process accountability improved performance in the non-random (high 
validity) condition, compared to all random (low validity) conditions. Both process and 
outcome accountability reduced errors of commission in random environments. Being 
held accountable, in any form, generally reduced errors of commission in the non-random 
environment, as subjects found the higher-weighted quadrant earlier and continued to 
protect the quadrant from attack, improving their overall performance while not making 
mistakes. Figure 7 and Table 6 show how performance diverged during the experiment. 
ANOVA of accountability and validity showed those in the non-random environment 
outperforming those in the random environment F(1, 23507) = 37.1, p <.001. 
Environmental validity was the primary driver of results in Experiment 1a.  
Table 4  
 
Average Scores by Condition for Experiment 1a  
Condition n 
Mean 
Score SD SE 
Random Not Accountable 43 -16.66 22.86 3.49 
Random Outcome 38 -18.62 24.20 3.93 
Random Process 27 -15.41 19.89 3.83 
60/40 Not Accountable 25 2.94 28.21 5.64 
60/40 Outcome 23 6.93 30.41 6.34 
60/40 Process 22 11.05 27.27 5.81 
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Table 5 
  
Average Switches by Condition for Experiment 1a 
Condition n 
Mean 
Switches SD SE 
Random Not Accountable 43 25.81 15.85 2.42 
Random Outcome 38 22.47 14.60 2.37 
Random Process 27 22.41 15.64 3.01 
60/40 Not Accountable 25 21.24 13.09 2.62 
60/40 Outcome 23 15.74 10.15 2.12 
60/40 Process 22 15.55 13.63 2.91 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average condition scores across trials in Experiment 1a (random / 60 – 40). 
Average scores within conditions diverge based on the level of environmental 
randomness encountered. Shaded area represents standard error of the mean. 
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Table 6  
 
ANOVA of Environmental Validity on Average Score 
 
 df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Environmental Validity 1 24133 24133 38.64 <0.001*** 
     ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
How close do subjects in Experiment 1a get to matching the results predicted by 
perfectly random moves or an optimally Bayesian approach? Figures 8 and 9 show the 
subject performance compared to randomly switching and staying (a normal distribution 
around a score of -15) and performing as an optimal Bayesian (a normal distribution 
around a score of 78).  Those in the random conditions performed close to the expected 
results, while those who faced non-random environments under accountability, especially 
those under process pressures, performed between the perfectly random and perfectly 
Bayesian. We explore this further in Experiment 1b. 
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Figure 8. Overall score distribution in Experiment 1a by condition. The score 
distribution for choosing at random is depicted in orange (simulated results from 10,000 
games) and the score distribution of an optimal Bayesian in a non-random world is 
depicted in black (simulated results from 10,000 games).   
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Figure 9. Score distribution in Experiment 1a by condition. Random conditions are in the 
top row and non-random ones are in the bottom row. Not accountable subjects who faced 
a random environment (depicted in blue) performed in a manner close to choosing at 
random (depicted in orange). Process accountable subjects who faced a non-random 
environment (depicted in dark red) performed better than randomly choosing quadrants, 
but not as well as an optimal Bayesian. 
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Experiment 1b 
Results 
 While the results of Experiment 1a were inconclusive, the direction of effects was 
mostly consistent with the initial hypotheses. In Experiment 1b, we decreased the 
percentage of the time the higher-weighted quadrant was targeted in the non-random 
condition (from 60% to 40%), dropping it below the expected value threshold for 
switching. Subjects (N=106) in Experiment 1b experienced completely random targeting 
of quadrants, or one quadrant targeted 40% of the time and the remaining 60% randomly 
distributed amongst the remaining three quadrants.  
 We again sought to see if accountability led to differences in subjects’ final 
scores. Process accountability led to performance worse than both the control and 
outcome accountability in the random environment, but process improved performance 
above both the control and outcome accountability in the non-random environment. 
Outcome accountability degraded performance in the non-random environment compared 
to controls and process accountability, while outcome accountable subjects outperformed 
process ones in the random environment. These results are wholly consistent with 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b and partially support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The performance 
differences between outcome and not accountable subjects was not significant.    
 Table 7 displays the final scores of subjects in the task and effects of varying 
accountability and environmental validity. Varying environmental validity for 
accountable subjects led to a significant effect on performance scores (d = .35) when 
compared to the not accountable subjects. While process accountable subjects had the 
highest average scores in the non-random environment (M = 35.5, SD = 29.5), they 
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simultaneously registered the worst performance in the random environment (M = -17.5, 
SD = 20.6). Being held accountable for outcomes led to worse performance compared to 
not being held accountable in both the random and non-random conditions, although the 
differences were not significant. Table 8 shows the total times subjects switched 
quadrants during the experiment. Outcome accountable subjects under random conditions 
switched quadrants the most (M = 25.3, SD = 15.0) while process accountable subjects 
working under similar random conditions followed closely behind (M = 21.1, SD = 11.4). 
Notably, process accountable subjects in the non-random condition had the least number 
of switches (M = 8.0, SD = 5.1), registering a large effect (d = -1.02) over the control. 
 
 
Table 7 
  
Average Scores by Condition in Experiment 1b 
Condition n 
Mean 
Score SD SE 
Cohen’s 
d 
 
Random Not Accountable 17 -7.15 37.20 9.02   
Random Outcome 31 -10.32 28.09 5.04 -0.10  
Random Process 18 -17.52 20.63 4.86 -0.34  
40-60 Not Accountable 14 5.29 32.72 8.75 0.35  
40-60 Outcome 15 1.27 25.40 6.56 0.26  
40-60 Process 11 35.54 29.55 8.91 1.24  
 
Table 8  
 
Average Switches by Condition in Experiment 1b 
Condition n 
Mean 
Switches SD SE 
 Cohen’s 
d 
Random Not Accountable 17 19.94 14.31 3.47   
Random Outcome 31 21.06 14.98 2.69  0.08 
Random Process 18 25.29 11.42 2.69  0.36 
40-60 Not Accountable 14 16.86 16.02 4.28  -0.20 
40-60 Outcome 15 21.07 13.22 3.41  0.08 
40-60 Process 11 8.00 5.10 1.54  -1.02 
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To what extent does increased deliberative information processing explain the 
differences in final scores? Accountability manipulations overall increased the total 
number of rationales provided by subjects, as well as length of those rationales, compared 
to not accountable subjects. Table 9 shows the large effect that process accountability had 
on both providing a rationale (M = 13.17 and 17.64) and the average length of those 
rationales in characters (M = 37.02 and 36.57). These differences were consistent with the 
differences observed in final score.  
While these descriptive statistics support the hypothesized relationship between 
process accountability and performance where increased deliberate processing mediates 
the effect between accountability type and total score, a formal mediation analysis did not 
fully support the model. The relationship between accountability type and total score was 
not mediated by amount of deliberate processing, although the results were directionally 
consistent with the hypothesis. As Figure 10 illustrates, the standardized regression 
coefficient between accountability type and average length of comments was statistically 
significant; however, the standardized regression coefficient between average number of 
comments and total score was not. The standardized indirect effect was (17.49)(-0.25) = 
34.59. We tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. 
Unstandardized indirect effects were computed (using the mediate package in R) for each 
of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was computed by 
determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The bootstrapped 
unstandardized indirect effect was 0.12, and the 95% confidence interval ranged from -
1.84, 4.61. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant. 
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More deliberate processing could also have led to less switching, that is, focusing 
on the real patterns when they are present led subjects to make fewer errors of 
commission. The results of a mediation model where deliberate processing resulted in 
less switching was stronger, but not again, definitive. As Figure 11 illustrates, the 
standardized regression coefficient between accountability type and was marginally 
significant and the standardized regression coefficient between average number of 
comments and total score was significant. The standardized indirect effect was (-8.86)(-
1.64) = 15.70. We again tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping 
procedures. Unstandardized indirect effects were computed (using the mediate package in 
R) for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval was 
computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The 
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was -6.89, and the 95% confidence interval 
ranged from -23.12, 11.73. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant. 
However, based on the significant links between accountability type, level of deliberate 
processing, and total score, it is possible that a larger sample would have yielded a 
significant result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Deliberate Processing by Condition in Experiment 1b 
Environment Accountability Mean Cohen’s d Mean length Cohen’s d 
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rationale 
count 
of rationale 
Random None 1.06  11.47  
Random Outcome 0.71 -0.29 6.00 -0.32 
Random Process 13.17  0.89 37.02  0.77 
Non-Random None 0.14 -0.86 0.46 -0.60 
Non-Random Outcome 0.60 -0.39 3.64 -0.42 
Non-Random Process 17.64  1.21 36.57  0.88 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Mediation model of average comment length, accountability, and total score. 
Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between accountability type and 
total score as mediated by average comment length. The standardized regression 
coefficient between accountability type and total score, controlling for average comment 
length, is in parentheses. 
 
Accountability
Avg Comment	
Length
Total	Score
-0.2517.49***
30.26*		(34.59)
***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*p<0.05;	.	p<0.10
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Figure 11. Mediation model of switches, accountability, and total score. Standardized 
regression coefficients for the relationship between accountability type and total score as 
mediated by number of switches made by the subject. The standardized regression 
coefficient between accountability type and total score, controlling for switches, is in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Accountability
Switches
Total	Score
-1.64***-8.86
30.26	(15.70)
.
.
***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*p<0.05;	.	p<0.10
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Figure 12. Scores across trials in Experiment 1b (random / 40 – 60). Process 
accountable subjects outperformed outcome and non-accountable subjects (depicted in 
dark red) in the non-random environment but underperformed the same conditions in the 
random environment (depicted in light red). Shaded areas are standard errors of the 
mean scores. 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the divergence of average scores by condition over the course 
of the experiment. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4: the predicted effects of fewer 
errors of commission (switches) by process accountable subjects occurred, and outcome 
subjects did learn to commit fewer errors in the random condition. Figure 12 also 
illustrates the effects of process accountability, which diverged significantly depending 
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on whether subjects were encountering a random or non-random environment. Outcome 
accountable forecasters improved their scores between trials 45 and 60 in the non-random 
environment, but before that time committed errors of commission by switching 
quadrants more frequently, leading to diminished overall scores. Figures 12 and 13 
together show subject performance compared to a hypothetical subject who makes an 
initially random choice and stays in the initially chosen quadrant (a normal distribution 
around mean of -15) and optimally Bayesian performance (a normal distribution around 
the mean of 48). Notably, being accountable for process when faced with a non-random, 
predictable environment moved subject performance much closer to optimally Bayesian 
in Experiment 1b than it did in Experiment 1a. Conversely, the distributions of scores for 
process accountable subjects in a random environment more closely resembled the 
random guesser in 1b than in 1a. See Figures 13 and 14. 
 51 
 
 
Figure 13. Overall score distribution density by conditions in Experiment 1b. The score 
distribution for choosing at random is depicted in orange (simulated results from 10,000 
games) and the score distribution of an optimal Bayesian in a non-random world is 
depicted in brown (simulated results from 10,000 games).   
 
 52 
 
Figure 14. Score distributions in Experiment 1b by condition, separated. Not accountable 
subjects who faced a random environment (depicted in black) performed in a manner 
close to choosing at random (depicted in orange). Process accountable subjects who 
faced a non-random environment (depicted in purple) performed the best and close to an 
optimal Bayesian. Process accountable subjects who faced a random environment 
(depicted in green) underperformed.  
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Table 10 
 
ANOVA of Accountability and Environment in Experiment 1b 
Condition df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Accountability 2 1536 768 0.91 0.407 
Environment 1 13431 13431 15.85 0.001*** 
Accountability * Environment 2 8345 4173 4.92 0.009** 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Environment and accountability interaction plot. Process accountable 
subjects outperformed outcome and not accountable subjects in the non-random 
conditions, but underperformed in the random condition. 
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To further underscore the boost in performance from process in the non-random 
environment but has no significant effect on performance in random environments, see 
Table 10 and Figure 15. Table 10 and Figure 15 illustrate the significant interaction 
between accountability and environmental randomness. An analysis of variance on total 
scores yielded significant variation amongst conditions, F(2, 8345)=4.92, p <.001. A post 
hoc Tukey test showed that process accountability in the high validity environment 
differed significantly from process in low validity environment at p<.001; process in high 
validity also differed significantly from outcome in low validity at p<.001, outcome in 
high validity at p<.05, and non-accountable subjects in low validity at p<.003.  While 
most subjects performed better in the high validity condition than in the low validity one, 
process accountable subjects performed significantly worse in the low validity 
environment but performed significantly better in the high validity one, an example of 
how accountability pressures can act as a dual-edged sword.  
Holding subjects accountable for the rationales behind their choices led to 
subjects ascertaining that one quadrant was higher-weighted than the rest, as illustrated 
by the reduction in switching behavior. Process accountable forecasters identified this 
pattern around trial 20, which occurred much more quickly than outcome accountable 
ones, who identified the higher-weighted quadrant on average around trial 45. These 
results are consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
 Why did process accountable subjects outperform in non-random worlds but 
perform significantly worse in random ones? Analyses of participants’ comments are 
suggestive. As previously noted in Table 9, subjects held accountable for process wrote 
more comments, which were also longer than those written by their non-accountable or 
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outcome accountable counterparts. While both other conditions were told in the initial 
instructions that they could take notes with the provided comment box below the map, in 
Experiment 1 only 19% of subjects not accountable for process wrote comments, whereas 
79% of process accountable subjects wrote comments. In Experiment 2, 27% of subjects 
who were not process accountable wrote comments, while 60% of process accountable 
subjects wrote comments. The comments from the non-accountable and outcome 
accountable subjects were sparse, mostly consisting of subjects trying to keep track of 
potential patterns of attacks on quadrants with numbers. Many of the process accountable 
subjects wrote full-sentence comments. Process accountable subjects were keenly 
focused on identifying potential patterns and thus in the non-random environment more 
quickly ascertained the quadrant being attacked more often. In the random environment, 
pseudo-patterns tended to mislead process accountable subjects. However, some subjects 
overcame this tendency, at multiple points commenting that the pattern they first thought 
existed did not, or that what was a seemingly random series of hits was actually more 
focused on a single quadrant. This active search for disconfirming information appears to 
have driven at least some process accountable subjects to change their minds during the 
task.  
 Recognizing the potential selection bias (perhaps only those that figured out the 
patterns wrote lengthy comments) in comments generated by subjects in the process 
accountability conditions, other analysis is needed. This preliminary conclusion is 
reinforced by examining the influence of a trait associated with rational thinking, actively 
open-minded thinking (AOMT), on final scores (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013; 
Stanovich, 2011). Several individual differences variables mentioned earlier were 
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collected—only AOMT yielded significant results, so only those results are reported 
here.  
In Study 1, those who scored higher on AOMT and were held accountable had 
significantly higher scores than those who were not held accountable but demonstrated 
similar levels of AOMT (Table 11). For process accountable subjects, possessing a 
tendency to search for disconfirming information likely helps to identify randomness 
earlier and reduce the urge to “chase” the correct quadrant. Thus, while spurring subjects 
to focus on finding patterns as a justified rationale for the moves that they made (a more 
concrete construal), process accountable subjects were possibly too focused on patterns 
unless they had higher levels of AOMT (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
 
Table 11  
 
Regression of Accountability and AOMT with Interaction Term 
 
B SE t p 
(Intercept) 0.33 20.50 0.02 0.99 
Outcome -66.07 29.39 -2.25 0.03* 
Process -66.43 31.52 -2.11 0.04 
AOMT -2.00 4.15 -0.48 0.63 
Outcome * AOMT 13.85 6.00 2.31 0.02* 
Process * AOMT 14.38 6.25 2.30 0.02* 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 Highly stochastic environments are challenging. While being more deliberate and 
conscientious about using a process helped subjects pick up on real patterns more 
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quickly, it appears that holding people accountable for process makes the task of 
navigating random environments more difficult. Process accountability improved 
performance in high validity environments while not helping performance in low validity 
ones. This was likely because a process focus led subjects to commit fewer errors of 
omission in the non-random environment (continuing to find the pattern until it was 
found), but more frequent errors of commission in the random environment (continuing 
to seek out a non-existent pattern). Outcome accountability did not have much of an 
effect on errors of omission in the non-random environment, but outcome focused 
subjects did commit fewer errors in the random environment when compared to those 
accountable for process. Process accountable subjects also discovered the true pattern 
more rapidly than outcome accountable ones in the non-random condition. Based on 
these two experiments, there is partial support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 4 and full 
support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 3. Accountability, both outcome and process, can 
indeed exhibit a dual-edged nature—helpful in some circumstances while harmful in 
others. 
 Some limitations of the current study need to be noted. First, we likely over-
estimated the effect size of the accountability manipulations. While previous research on 
accountability tended to yield results showing large effects (d = 0.80) (Chang, Vieider & 
Tetlock, in preparation), there was an asymmetry in effect sizes between the low and high 
validity conditions. Future work using the London Quadrants task should use larger 
samples (~220 or more subjects) in order to be adequately powered. Because the London 
Quadrants task spanned 60 trials as well as the collection of some individual differences 
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variables, we recommend using subject samples similar to the ones we had access to via a 
university behavioral lab. Such a lengthy task is not ideal for typical online samples.  
Second, future work should attempt to disaggregate the effects of the multi-
faceted nature of the process accountability condition vs. the outcome accountability 
condition. While subjects in both conditions were given the opportunity to write 
comments into a text box below the map of Lemon, only the subjects in the process 
accountable condition were incentivized to do so. A pure process accountability condition 
would have told subjects only that they were accountable for the reasons for the choices 
they made, while not mandating that they write anything extra. Removing the writing 
requirement would more closely match the performance requirements in the outcome 
condition. It is possible that the additional time spent on the task, during the writing 
process or preparing to write comments, is what led to the score improvements relative to 
the outcome and non-accountable conditions. Conversely, a follow-on experiment could 
incentivize outcome subjects to write comments, while still relaying that they are 
accountable only for their final score. This, again, would parallelize the conditions.  
Third, future experiments with the London Quadrants task could further align the 
incentive structure for the process and outcome accountability conditions. Outcome 
accountable subjects received credit for each additional point they garnered—thus, 
process accountable subjects could similarly be incentivized for each rationale provided 
in support of a choice. While there is no reason, a priori, to think that an atomized 
incentive structure such as the one provided to the outcome accountable subjects would 
lead to divergent behavior from the more holistic incentive structure for the process 
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accountable subjects, parallelizing the incentive structures would help to eliminate the 
potential confound. 
Finally, while the distribution of bomb attacks in each experiment was chosen 
because the mathematical solution to the London Quadrants task spelled out differing 
courses of behavior, further exploration of the level of randomness in the environment 
would shed light on when exactly does process accountability help, harm, or do nothing 
to performance. In the conditions that featured completely random targeting of quadrants, 
in both experiments the direction of effects, while not significant, were consistent with 
the hypothesized relationships between accountability type and environmental validity. 
Further experiments should systematically explore the spectrum of randomness between 
the low validity conditions (arguably “no validity”) and the high validity conditions, and 
extending beyond the 60% concentration of bomb attacks in a single quadrant. This can 
be done in a few ways. First, by exploring the degrees of randomness between 25% 
concentration of bomb attacks in one quadrant and the 40% condition that appeared in 
Experiment 2, we can begin to understand just how little or how much of pattern process 
accountable subjects can pick up on. By gradually increasing the amount of non-
randomness, perhaps in as granular an incremental manner as a single percentage point 
difference, we can pinpoint the threshold at which process accountability begins to focus 
people on real patterns in the environment. Similarly, by exploring the degrees of 
randomness between the 40% concentration of bomb attacks condition in Experiment 2 
and the 60% concentration of bomb attacks condition in Experiment 1, we can identify 
the point at which the task becomes too easy (the pattern of attacks in one quadrant is 
obvious) and the effects of process accountability are swamped by the task structure. 
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Ideally, such a systematic approach to further experiments can hone in on the 
“Goldilocks” zone in which process accountability is helpful, the point at which process 
ceases to be helpful (and perhaps degrades judgments) because the patterns are too 
difficult to pick up on (the lower boundary on effects), and the point at which the task is 
too easy and everyone performs well (the upper boundary on effects). 
 Overall, the current results give some credence to the idea that process 
accountability specifically helps in some situations, but has no effect or potentially 
hinders performance in others. Logically, being accountable for following a process 
should only be helpful when the process reliably leads to desired outcomes. People 
navigating highly random environments, where there is likely no useful process that can 
be developed, are likely better served by focusing on outcomes. Outcome accountability 
helps by helping people spot randomness rather than trying to make sense of patterns that 
aren’t there. Consistent with the dozens of past studies (Chang, Vieider & Tetlock, in 
preparation) that have shown process accountability to be helpful in laboratory tasks 
where incentivizing deliberate processing is helpful when processes reliably lead to 
desired outcomes, process focus in a non-random world gets people to spot real patterns 
sooner. Choosing the most helpful kind of accountability requires knowing what kind of 
world one operates in, to the extent that knowledge is attainable. 
 However, in a world where even those who are experienced in the field are 
uncertain about the nature of the environment, recommending a simple accountability 
prescription is wholly inadequate. Here, a hybrid form of accountability that incentivizes 
both process and outcome may help people perform better universally. Preliminary 
results from Chang et al. (2017) indicate that hybrids could actually help in environments 
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where the level of randomness fluctuates or is not known ex ante. Hybrids constitute a 
type of intervention that is just now starting to receive experimental attention, but has 
long been in use in some financial firms and some government agencies. Future work is 
needed to explore whether or not hybrid accountability systems can tamp down the 
tendency to chase goals in highly random environments, while also boosting the speed 
with which subjects are able to extract real signals in noisy environments.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Accountability and Strategies for Avoiding Outcome-Biased Blame 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Probabilistic language is frequently used to describe uncertainties in everyday life. 
Researchers note that while verbal expressions of probability (e.g., likely, unlikely) are 
more naturalistic, numeric expressions (e.g., 55%) are more precise and verifiable. While 
decision makers have been criticized for continual usage of vague verbal expressions due 
to their lack of specificity (“weasel” words), decision makers may prefer these phrases 
because they can be employed to avoid blame for over- or under-estimating the 
probability of future events. In a series of experiments, two sets of subjects, one 
consisting of individuals with governmental policy-making experience and one 
representing the general public, were asked for their perceptions of the probability of a 
terrorist attack. Probabilities were relayed as high or low likelihood estimates and either 
verbally or numerically. Subjects were then asked whether these estimates were justified 
after learning of one of four possible outcomes: 1) a terrorist plot successfully thwarted, 
2) a hoax terrorist plot properly identified, 3) a terrorist plot unsuccessfully thwarted, and 
4) a hoax terrorist plot not properly identified as such. In the first study, policymakers 
preferred verbal probabilities over numeric ones, with some subjects justifying this 
preference by stating that the numeric probabilities gave the illusion of precision. In the 
second study, subjects standing in for the general public judged negative outcomes more 
harshly when they were relayed with numeric probabilities than with verbal ones. The 
results of this study show that preference for vague expressions of probability may be a 
rational defense mechanism against anticipated outcome bias.  
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Introduction 
 
For democracy to function properly, policymakers must be held accountable for 
their actions (Przeworski et al., 1999; Tocqueville, 1945). Typically, in order for 
accountability to be carried out and responsibility properly assigned, the original 
judgment must be specific, public, and the eventual outcome unambiguous. However, 
political actors (e.g., policymakers, pundits, legislators, etc.) typically express their 
judgments in ambiguous ways with vague verbal probabilities (e.g., likely, more often 
than not, possibly). Most recently, intelligence agencies have been criticized for 
conveying their assessments in vague probabilistic terms, as opposed to more specific 
numeric ones (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2015; Tetlock & Mellers, 2011a).  
The benefits of using vague language and consistent departures from the behavior 
predicted by expected utility theory has been a subject of ongoing interest within political 
science, specifically within the context of leaders’ and legislators’ public expressions of 
policy preferences (Alesina & Cukierman, 1987; Page, 1976; Tomz & Van Houweling, 
2009). Does the rationality of probabilistic posturing as a form of accountability 
avoidance extend to politicians’ judgments of future events? 
Verbal vs. Numeric Probabilities 
 
 What are the key differences between verbal and numeric expressions of 
probabilities and how do these advantages and disadvantages relate to accountability 
systems? Using verbal probabilities is widely thought to be more natural and common 
(Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, and Kemp (1993) found that the 
primary perceived advantages of preferring verbal probabilities included ease of use, 
while being able to convey higher precision drove the preference for numeric 
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probabilities. While most respondents were unable to articulate when and why they 
would switch between the two modes, those that did respond primarily cited issue 
importance and data quality as reasons for switching: probabilities associated with 
unimportant and uncertain issues should be expressed verbally while important issues 
with higher data quality should be expressed numerically.  
Previous research found similar patterns in preferences for and against numeric 
and verbal probabilities (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985, 1990), with the imprecision of 
verbal probabilities (due to wide variance and lack of interpersonal agreement as to how 
exactly verbal phrases map to numeric ranges) as one notable drawback to verbal 
probabilities (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Hamm, 
1991; Rapoport, Wallsten, Erev, & Cohen, 1990).   
Blame, Credit, and Accountability Avoidance    
 When would decision-makers try to avoid accountability by using vague 
verbiage? National-level decision-makers, from executive branch policymakers to 
legislators, have been characterized as having the motive of maximizing credit and 
minimizing blame in an effort to retain their jobs (Sulitzeanu-Kenan & Hood). To go 
from this general rational motive to action requires the opportunity to choose alternatives 
that allow for credit maximization and blame minimization. It logically follows that when 
the balance between credit and blame is weighted towards blame, accountability should 
be avoided and vague probabilities preferred – a choice consistent with other socio-
functionalist frameworks (Tetlock, 2002). Conversely, when a policymaker wants to 
maximize credit – supporting pro-business policies that lead to gains in equity markets, 
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for example – they may choose to use precise probabilities because they want people to 
evaluate them for their decision. 
Thus, choosing to employ vague verbiage is an example of a low-effort evasion 
tactic around accountability (M. C. Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000) and a way to manage 
public impressions by being imprecise to the point where the observer has no firm 
grounding for what probability was actually communicated (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). 
Resorting to vague verbiage is a choice that policymakers would likely make (based on 
the audience approval motive) insofar as they believe that the public will seek to blame 
them for failing 1) to properly predict an event outcome and 2) to take the steps necessary 
to prevent this outcome (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock & Lerner, 1999), even if the 
outcome chance was remote to begin with. Essentially, policymakers are taking 
advantage of the communicative ambiguity inherent in conveying probabilities verbally 
(Patt & Schrag, 2003).  
It follows that numeric probabilities can be disadvantageous because the 
transmitter is on the hook for their judgments, as the numbers are concrete and can be 
evaluated for accuracy. Those who are held accountable may feel trapped by numeric 
probabilities and would therefore prefer vague verbal probabilities when they are seeking 
to avoid accountability. Numeric estimates are scorable via proper and other rules and for 
which deviation from normative standards of calibration and resolution can be measured 
(Brier, 1950; Murphy & Winkler, 1984; Winkler & Murphy, 1968), allowing 
accountability processes to be carried out. Policymakers likely take into account the 
outcome bias of the public in the evaluation of their decisions and seek to minimize their 
exposure to outcome biased blaming, which is more likely to occur when the probability 
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of event occurrence is high (Agrawal & Maheswaran, 2005; Baron & Hershey, 1988; 
Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004). From this, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Decision-makers will prefer to employ vague verbal probability 
expressions when the event has a high probability of occurrence. 
Blame avoidance and credit taking also likely explain policymaker preferences 
when the probability of event occurrence is low. Policymakers may seek to inoculate 
themselves from accusations of not warning of an event when it comes to those that are 
associated with high cost functions but low probabilities of occurrence, such as terrorist 
acts (which pumps up the cost of false negatives and minimizes the perceived, but not 
actual, costs of false positives). On the other hand, decision-makers may choose to 
employ precise numeric probabilities when they are seeking to maximize credit, which 
would be less costly if the event in question was one with positive consequences. In the 
case of blame avoidance and minimization, likely associated with events with negative 
consequences, policymakers want to people to remember their warnings and to be able to 
evaluate them for accuracy when the costs of a false negative are higher than the costs of 
a false positive. Policymakers are additionally aided by the fact that people tend to 
interpret numeric probabilities in a directionally ambiguous manner, in effect allowing 
the communicator to argue that they meant to emphasize either the possibility of 
occurrence of non-occurrence of the event depending on how things turned out (Bilgin & 
Brenner, 2013). High probability numeric probabilities are almost always interpreted 
“positively” (that the event will occur) (Bilgin & Brenner, 2013). Thus, it follows that:   
 
Hypothesis 1b: Decision-makers will prefer to employ precise numeric 
expressions when the event has a low probability of occurrence. 
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Because vague probabilities are imprecise and can be interpreted in a myriad of 
ways, policymakers can resort to self-justifying explanations for their actions regardless 
of how the event turns out. However, because numeric probabilities are evaluable and 
precise, policymakers may find themselves cut-off from employing such self-justifying 
behavior. Indeed, Friedman et al. (2017), surveying national security professionals, found 
decision-makers were less willing to support risky actions when those risks were 
conveyed quantitatively and more willing to seek additional information to improve their 
understanding of the situation. From this, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Decision-makers will feel more justified in their decision to act 
on high probability events and less justified on low probability events after 
employing vague verbiage.  
Hypothesis 2b: Decision-makers will feel less justified in their decision to act on 
high probability events (but not low probability events) after employing numeric 
probabilities. 
The general public, on the other hand, likely has a different take on the value of 
communicating warnings with verbal or numeric probabilities. While verbal probabilities 
feel more naturalistic and are more commonly used in everyday language, they leave 
room for interpretation as to what exactly was meant and are often context dependent 
(Brun & Teigen, 1988). Even interpretation of the qualifiers of verbal expressions (e.g., 
some, not all) are seemingly context dependent (Teigen & Brun, 2003). Because the 
receiver must infer the ultimate meaning of verbal expressions of uncertainty, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to judge the accuracy of verbal estimates, especially in cases 
where the transmitter of the estimate is in disagreement with its recipient. In this case, 
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numeric probabilities are advantageous precisely because they convey exact information. 
In fact, robust results from past research have shown that people generally prefer precise 
expressions of uncertainty over imprecise ones (Curley & Yates, 1985; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1985; Ellsberg, 1961). There are some exceptions to the general preference for 
ambiguity aversion, such as a preference for verbal probabilities when the underlying 
data quality is poor, especially for the transmitter (recipients still preferred precise 
estimates) (Olson & Budescu, 1997). On the other hand, precise numeric probabilities 
hold advantages for account-takers because it leaves little room for the accountable to 
wiggle out of evaluations of the accuracy of their judgments, and experimental evidence 
supports the idea that people like to receive numeric assessments (Wallsten & Budescu, 
1995).  
Thus, the public may have different interpretations of the wisdom of employing 
vague verbiage or precise probabilities. The general public may prefer precise 
probabilities at all times because they are the account-takers. They may perceive 
policymakers who choose to employ vague verbiage as blame-avoiders and thus see them 
in a harsher light. It follows that audiences may also see action as more justified when 
precise numeric probabilities are used, possibly because (as previously discussed) precise 
probabilities convey stronger underlying information. Finally, it is possible that after 
performing all of this mental processing, the public audience may not actually be 
outcome-biased at all, insofar as they seek to make their thinking processes coherent and 
generally try to reduce dissonance. A public audience may ignore the likelihood (level of 
assessed probability) that the policymaker conveyed in the first place. For example, if the 
policymaker conveyed the probabilities precisely and the event did not occur, even if the 
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event was assessed as low probability to begin with, the audience may feel that the false 
positive was justified. From this, we draw the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Observers will generally prefer numeric probabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Observers who receive precise warning information will feel that a 
policymaker was not justified in taking action if the result is a false positive but 
not a false negative.  
 
Method 
Procedure and Subjects 
The current study was conducted in two parts. In Experiment 1, subjects with 
government and policymaking experience (N=113) were recruited and responded to a 
survey. Within this sample, 65% had either a master’s degree or professional degree, 65% 
served between 1 and 10 years in government, 57% were between the ages of 30 and 40, 
and 30% had served in a policy role.  
Experiment 1 subjects were told to imagine being the President of the United 
States and randomly presented with information warning of a possible terrorist attack 
either as high- or low-likelihood. Subjects were then given a choice of conveying this 
information to the public, either as verbal (e.g., likely, unlikely) or numeric (70%, 20%) 
probabilities. At this point in the study, the subjects were presented with a choice: they 
could either act or not act, depending on how they viewed the severity and veracity of the 
warnings they were given. Subjects were then asked how justified they felt in taking 
action based on the information presented. Then, based on their choice to take action or 
not take action, the subjects were randomly informed of whether their inaction or action 
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led to good or bad outcomes. Inaction could avoid an error of commission or commit an 
error of omission, and taking action could avoid an error of omission or commit an error 
of commission. At the end of the experimental section of the survey, subjects were again 
asked how justified they felt in taking action, and then answered an individual differences 
survey to collect demographic and other information.  
In the second part of this study, Experiment 2, we used a similar design but 
changed the role of subjects. Undergraduate subjects (N=141) were recruited to play the 
role of the general public (which in this context translates to political account-takers) for 
course credit. 67% of the sample identified as female and 44% were Caucasian. Subjects 
were randomly informed of one of four options: that the President had been given 
information that showed either a low or high likelihood of a future terrorist attack and 
that information was presented either verbally or numerically.  
Materials 
Experiment 1 (“policymaker”) subjects were asked to imagine acting as the 
President of the United States. They were warned of an impending terrorist attack before 
a major holiday and the likelihood of the attack could be either high or low. Subjects then 
had the choice of conveying the warning to the public with either a verbal or numeric 
probability. They were then asked whether they would ground all civilian aircraft ahead 
of the holiday or allow flights to continue and also how justified they felt about taking 
such an action. Following their response, they were randomly assigned an outcome 
variable, either actions coupled with a positive or negative outcome (e.g., you decided to 
ground flights but the attack turned out to be a hoax, or you grounded flights and several 
terrorists were arrested on their way to the airport) or inaction coupled with positive or 
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negative outcomes. They were then asked to rate how justified they felt in taking or not 
taking action (1 = completely not justified to 7 = completely justified). For the complete 
survey that was administered to subjects in Experiment 1, see the methodological 
appendix for Chapter 2. 
Experiment 2 (“public”) subjects were told that the President of the United States 
had received either verbal or numeric warnings at either low or high likelihoods of an 
impending terrorist attack and were asked how justified the President would be if the 
President decided to ground all air traffic in light of this information. Subjects were then 
randomly presented with the choice of the president, either to ground all aircraft or not 
ground any aircraft. They were asked to rate how justified the actions were at a second 
point. Finally, subjects were informed of the outcome of the action depending on whether 
they were presented with action or inaction by the President: the outcomes could be good 
(e.g., action that stopped the terrorist attack or inaction that led to avoiding an error of 
commission, falling for a hoax) or bad (e.g., action that led to making an error of 
commission, in this case falling for a hoax, or inaction that led to an error of omission, in 
this case a successful terrorist attack). For the complete survey that was administered to 
subjects in Experiment 2, see the methodological appendix for Chapter 2. 
Results 
Experiment 1 
 In the initial analysis, we wanted to see if there was an impact of probabilistic 
likelihood on the kind of expression chosen. Overall, subjects chose to convey warnings 
to the public about equally between numeric and verbal probabilities, with 48% 
preferring to warn with numeric probabilities and 52% preferring verbal ones. Whether 
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there was a high or low likelihood of a terrorist attack predicted the choice of 
probabilities (B = .51, SE = .08, t=6.15(111), p < .001) where a high likelihood of an 
attack pushed subjects to choose vague verbal probabilities per Table 1. This supports 
Hypothesis 1a, which posited that subjects would prefer numeric probabilities when 
likelihoods are low, and also supports Hypothesis 1b, which posited that when 
likelihoods are high, subjects would prefer to employ vague verbal probabilities.   
Table 1  
  
Subject Probability Type Choices Based on Likelihood of Attack in Experiment 1 
Event Likelihood 
Probability 
Type 
Chosen n % of Subjects 
Low Likelihood Numeric 46 41% 
High Likelihood Numeric 8 7% 
Low Likelihood Verbal 21 19% 
High Likelihood Verbal 38 34% 
 
Next, we wanted to see if there was a difference in perceived justification level 
based on whether the outcome experienced was positive or negative. As expected, 
subjects who were randomly assigned to a condition with higher likelihoods of attack 
were more likely to choose to ground flights (B = .21, SE = .09, t=2.25(111), p < .03). In 
aggregate, the average level of perceived justification of the decision made was 
approximately 4.9, with differences (t=5.46(85.7), p < .001) between those who 
experienced positive outcomes (n=57, M= 5.7, SD = .96) versus negative ones (n=56, 
M=4.2, SD=1.74), registering a large effect (d = -1.03). Experiencing negative outcomes 
predicted decreases in justification levels (B = -1.45, SE = 0.26, p < .001).   
Based on these results, we then investigated whether or not the chosen mode of 
probabilistic expression and the likelihood of event occurrence interacted with outcome 
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type on justification levels. Subjects felt more justified in their decision to act after 
employing vague verbiage, while those who chose to use numeric probabilities felt less 
justified even when the probability of occurrence was high (possibly feeling regretful for 
being so precise). Overall, there is full support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. See Table 2 and 
Figures 1 and 2 for interactions. 
Table 2  
 
ANOVA of Outcome Type, Likelihood, and Choice of Probability Type on Justification in 
Experiment 1 
 
  df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Outcome Type 3 77.05 25.684 14.801 0.001*** 
Choice of Prob Type 1 0.32 0.315 0.182 0.67 
Likelihood 1 1.41 1.407 0.811 0.370 
Outcome * Prob Type 3 1.52 0.508 0.293 0.830 
Outcome * Likelihood 3 20.99 6.997 4.032 0.010** 
Prob Type * Likelihood 1 8.39 8.388 4.834 0.030* 
Outcome * Prob Type * 
Likelihood 3 1.68 0.56 0.322 0.800 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 
Figure 1. Interaction between event likelihood and probability type choice for 
policymaker subjects. Subjects felt more justified with their choice when they chose to 
express their warnings numerically when event likelihood was low and verbally when 
event likelihood was high. Conversely, subjects felt less justified with their choice when 
they chose to express their warnings numerically when event likelihood was high and 
verbally when event likelihood was low. 
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Figure 2. Action and outcome type influences perceived justification of action for 
policymaker subjects. Subjects felt more justified with their actions when they took action 
regardless of the outcome type; however, they felt less justified when they successfully 
acted to prevent a high probability of attack (expected success) and less justified when 
they acted unsuccessfully against a low probability attack. Subjects felt generally less 
justified when they did not act and the outcome was negative. Mean levels of justification 
with SE error bars. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Subjects in Experiment 2 encountered similar stimulus materials to subjects in 
Experiment 1, with the key change of perspective being that they served as observers of a 
President conveying threat information and making decisions about how best to mitigate 
the threat. Here we sought to examine whether the probability type used to express the 
warning of attack interacted with the likelihood of attack on perceived justification levels 
 76 
for taking action. As expected, subjects felt that the fictional President would have been 
more justified in taking action when the likelihood of attack was relayed as high. While 
in general subjects felt that numeric probabilities were a stronger justification for action, 
the probability type used to convey the threat information interacted such that verbally-
conveyed high likelihoods were associated with the higher levels of justification 
compared to verbally-conveyed low likelihoods (F=4.09(124), p=.045). See Figure 3. 
This partially supports Hypothesis 3.  
 
Figure 3. Interaction between probability type and event likelihood on justification level 
for general public subjects. Subjects perceived justification levels for action as higher 
when the event likelihood was high and the warning was conveyed with numeric 
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probabilities, although the shift upwards in justification level was stronger for verbal 
probabilities moving from low to high likelihood of event occurrence.   
 
What drove subjects’ justification levels once they were informed that actions 
were taken to mitigate the threat as well as the outcome? Subjects demonstrated at least 
some outcome bias—their justification levels were higher when the outcome was positive 
(B = 1.49, p <0.001) and when action was taken (B = 1.17, p < 0.001), but they also 
showed decreases in perceived justification level when the likelihood of the event was 
high and the information was conveyed numerically, which supports Hypothesis 4. See 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
Regression Analysis for Outcomes and Probability Types on Post-Action Justification 
Level in Experiment 2 
 
B SE t p 
(Intercept) 3.654 0.323 11.301 0.001*** 
Likelihood 0.612 0.347 1.763 0.081 
Prob Type 0.204 0.341 0.600 0.550 
Outcome Type 1.494 0.339 4.408 0.001*** 
Action Taken 1.175 0.336 3.495 0.001*** 
Likelihood * Prob Type -1.106 0.492 -2.248 0.027* 
Outcome * Action -0.589 0.488 -1.207 0.230 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
  
What drove the change in justification level for the general public stand-in 
subjects? Interestingly, shifts in justification level – from before the outcome was known 
to after – were largely driven by independent factors. Subjects decreased their 
justification levels from measurement at time-1 to time-2 when the probability was 
conveyed numerically and likelihoods were high, while shifting upwards their level of 
perceived justification of action when the outcomes were positive and when action was 
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taken by decision-makers, demonstrating both bias towards action and outcome bias. See 
Table 4.  
 
Table 4 
  
Regression Analysis for Differences in Justification Levels Between Time 1 and 2 in 
Experiment 2 
 
B SE t p 
(Intercept) -0.171 0.410 -0.416 0.678 
Likelihood -1.035 0.440 -2.352 0.020* 
Prob Type -1.041 0.432 -2.412 0.018* 
Outcome Type 1.255 0.429 2.924 0.004** 
Action Taken 1.048 0.426 2.460 0.015* 
Likelihood * Prob Type -0.138 0.623 -0.221 0.826 
Outcome * Action -0.208 0.618 -0.337 0.737 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
Discussion 
 
To review, decision-makers generally preferred conveying the likelihood of event 
occurrence with verbal probabilities when probabilities were high and numeric 
probabilities when they were low. This result supports Hypotheses 1a and 1b, which 
predicted the lowest risk use of language, as predicted by a desire to avoid blame in the 
event that things turned out badly. Decision-maker subjects also felt more justified in 
their decisions after conveying verbal probabilities than when warnings were conveyed 
numerically, supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The subjects who stood in for the 
“public” demonstrated outcome bias in their judgments of decision-makers, rating them 
as less justified in taking action when things turned out poorly than when they turned out 
successfully. An interaction was present between likelihood and probability type, which 
shows that subjects felt decisions were less justifiable when the likelihood of the event 
was high and when that likelihood was conveyed (precisely) numerically. Overall, 
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subjects felt decisions were more justifiable when conveyed verbally. This partially 
supports Hypothesis 3 and fully supports Hypothesis 4.  
Some limitations to the current study are worth noting. First, the negative 
consequences of the terrorist attack made blame avoidance more likely than credit taking. 
It is possible that given a different kind of uncertain event – for example, the passage of a 
tax bill that would lead to an increase in economic growth or gains in the stock market – 
subjects may have made different choices for how they conveyed probabilities. Future 
work should explore how positive and negative valence of events influences or doesn’t 
influence the choice of probabilistic expression. Second, it is possible that policymaker 
subjects in Experiment 1 interpreted “unlikely” in a negative way, that is, they saw 
unlikely as conveying zero or close to zero probability of event occurrence. Thus, the 
preference for 20% in the low likelihood condition was spurred not by a preference for 
blame avoidance via precision but by the word “unlikely” unintentionally conveying an 
even lower likelihood. This limitation can be addressed by future research in several 
ways, two of which we will enumerate here.  
Follow-on experimentation could not only manipulate event valence but could 
present to subjects the same stimuli, that there is intelligence information showing 
indications of a terrorist attack and then allow subjects to choose to express a warning 
from a range of numeric probabilities (0-49% in a low likelihood condition, 51-100% in a 
high likelihood condition) or a range of verbal probabilities. By providing a range of 
options, we can begin to address the objection against unintended interpretations of 
arguably unequal probabilistic expressions (e.g., likely vs. 70%). Another potential 
follow-on experiment could more directly address probabilistic expression type 
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preference by prompting subjects that there is a low or high probability of event 
occurrence, then asking them how they would choose to express such a probability either 
numerically or verbally (via random assignment). After they make their initial choice, 
they would then be prompted with a choice of switching from numeric to verbal 
expression and vice versa. This experimental variation more directly accesses preferences 
for expression as an explicit choice. By allowing the subjects to choose their preferred 
word or number to express an event warning and then making the distinction between 
verbal and numeric expressions an explicit choice, subjects are not asked to make a 
choice that is potentially a false duality. Finally, it should be noted that the stimuli 
materials provided to subjects conveyed minimal information regarding the credibility of 
the information contained in the warning. Subjects may have found it difficult to choose a 
high numeric likelihood since doing so without more detailed information may have felt 
(justifiably) imprecise. Follow-on experiments should add more detail to the stimuli to 
see if that has an effect on the making a choice between numeric and verbal probability 
expressions.  
Taken altogether, the aforementioned results should give us pause at universally 
recommending that decision-makers and others in government should convey 
probabilistic information numerically (Barnes, 2016; Dhami, Mandel, Mellers, & 
Tetlock, 2015; Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012; Rapoport et al., 1990; Wallsten, 1990). It 
is possible that decision-makers have an intuitive understanding of the ways in which 
their constituencies and the public writ large demonstrate outcome bias in how they 
evaluate decisions. If the public tends to more harshly judge decision-makers when things 
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go badly and less harshly when things turn out okay, using purposefully vague verbiage 
may be a linguistic defense mechanism against unfair evaluation.  
Certainly, there is value in numeric probabilities since they are more precise and 
thus forecasts made with them are verifiable, but the extent that this utility is reflected in 
policymaker considerations is unknown. It is also potentially erroneous to think that 
precision and verifiability factor into net policymaker utility. Scientists may prefer such 
precise numbers, but being intentionally vague may be a rational and pre-emptive defense 
against post-hoc biased public perceptions of decisions.  
Finally, what is politically rational might still be cognitively suboptimal in several 
ways. Friedman, Lerner, and Zeckhauser (2017) found that decision makers tended to be 
less willing to support risky actions after viewing numeric probabilities and were more 
willing to seek additional information. Numeric probabilities essentially exposed their 
gaps in knowledge. Verbal probabilities also contain less precise information, which 
makes it harder to verify, assess, and learn from mis-calibrated estimates. This reduction 
in precision also degrades the quality of deliberations and debates because the sender and 
receiver of the probabilities do not know exactly how those probabilities will be 
interpreted. Future work should focus on whether numeric probabilities help people learn 
more quickly from mistakes (an as-yet untested proposition) and the degree to which 
numeric probabilities offer more inter-subjective agreement than verbal probabilities.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Accountability and an Increased Need for Cognitive Closure 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Politicians usually enact policies that are congruent with their political ideology, even 
when the net utility of doing so is not yet known. Democratic accountability may 
exacerbate this tendency, as political leaders may feel pressure to ideological congruency 
especially keenly when they are seeking office or running for re-election. This is contrary 
to the widespread notion that democratic accountability is the most powerful lever that 
constituents have over their elected officials for ensuring the advancement of public 
interest. In this study, subjects were asked about two politically-charged issues, 
environmental cleanup or gun safety, and whether they preferred a risky enactment of 
such policies for saving lives (e.g., a 90% chance of saving 100 lives, a 50% chance of 
saving 100 lives, or a 10% chance of saving 100 lives) over an ideologically and value 
neutral one, in this case, funding a new hospital (e.g., which would save 90, 50 or 10 
lives, respectively). Subjects universally preferred politically congruent policies, despite a 
value neutral option being available. This preference occurred regardless of whether they 
were held accountable or not. Political ideology predicted the amount of ambiguity 
reduction needed for recommending both the environmental cleanup and gun safety 
policies.  
 
 
 
Keywords: political ideology, democratic accountability, ambiguity reduction, need for 
closure 
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Introduction 
 
Political leaders and appointed policymakers are elected to implement policies 
(i.e., legally binding rules and regulations) that advance the public interest. These policy 
preferences are typically congruent with an individuals’ political ideology (Dutt & Mitra, 
2005; Jost et al., 2009). These policy choices involve uncertainty about whether the 
policy ultimately will be successful.  Because the outcomes from enacted policy are 
uncertain, especially when the policies (pre-implementation) lack supporting empirical 
evidence of their efficacy, political leaders often base their policy preferences and 
priorities on underlying ideology (Budge, 1994). However, the linkage between political 
ideology and which policy choices to pursue is far from direct, as this relationship is 
constrained by the accountability structures present in democracies (both for sanctioning 
leaders who pursue unpopular policies and for promoting leaders who do) and attenuated 
by uncertainty regarding the net impact (positive or negative) of the policy in question 
(Przeworski et al., 1999).  
 The contemporary debate over climate change science and associated policies 
illustrates how uncertainty about outcomes can be erased by the psychological pressure 
from political ideology. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2013 
report clearly lays out the physical science case for man-made climate change and 
appropriately caveats each concluding statement with probabilistic language, indicating 
uncertainty level.2 While the IPCC does acknowledge that uncertainty exists at the 
margins, those who disagree with the IPCC’s conclusions label the work of the scientists 
                                                
2 See: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/  
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as a “hoax” and “conspiracy”, essentially erasing the mountains of physical evidence that 
is concordant with the vast majority of theories of man-made climate change.3  
Conversely, those with potentially legitimate disagreements with the science who 
do not entirely believe the scientific results underpinning climate change claims have 
been labeled  “denialists.”4 This is despite the fact that warranted skepticism is an 
essential element to the advancement of science and the execution of the scientific 
method. Even though the predictions from climate change science are imperfect and the 
research is presented with appropriate caveats by organizations such as the IPCC, many 
people aligned with liberal political leanings reflexively denounce and negatively label 
anyone with potentially legitimate concerns regarding scientific uncertainty (Armstrong, 
K. C. Green, & Soon, 2008; K. C. Green & Armstrong, 2007; K. C. Green & Armstrong, 
2008; K. C. Green, Armstrong, & Soon, 2009; Hoffman, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011). By denying that such uncertainty exists, the result is that the policy choice is 
presented as “riskless”, such that the costs of implementing climate change policies, if 
man-made climate change is actually a false positive, are completely ignored 
(Leiserowitz, 2006).   
Psychologically, by attempting to erase the uncertainty surrounding climate 
science, politically liberal individuals are demonstrating an increased need for cognitive 
closure, a psychological trait and state that has been mostly used to describe those with 
more conservative political leanings (Chirumbolo et al., 2004; Jost, 2006; Jost & 
Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2008). While typically 
                                                
3 https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-
climate-agreement; https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/science/exxon-mobil-rockefellers-climate-
change.html  
4 http://news.sciencemag.org/scientific-community/2015/09/associated-press-no-more-climate-skeptics-or-
deniers  
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investigated as a dispositional variable, some researchers, such as Arie Kruglanski and 
others, have shown that need for cognitive closure can be seen as proportional in 
magnitude to the benefits of closure and costs of lacking closure, as well as moderated by 
situational factors (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1997; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). We would expect similar 
motivation to reduce the distance from closure for conservatives when the outcomes from 
an ideologically aligned issue are similarly uncertain. From this literature, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of decision risk a policymaker is willing to accept is 
negatively correlated with preference for a policy.  
 
Citizens are interested in ensuring that political leaders are acting in their best 
interest, and electoral accountability is the primary lever that they can pull to keep 
politicians honest. Accountability is considered an essential feature of democracy 
because it provides the feedback loop that improves governance and aligns policymaker 
choices to public opinion over time (Bovens et al., 2014; Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999). 
However, the force exerted by accountability pressures could actually be 
counterproductive insofar as it pushes political leaders to adopt ideologically-aligned 
policies while down-weighting the risks associated with policy implementation. From 
this, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Accountability to the public increases the amount of cognitive 
closure reduction sought for politically-incongruent policy preferences.  
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Hypothesis 3: Accountability to the public decreases the amount of cognitive 
closure associated with politically-congruent policy preferences. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the presence and use of accountability 
mechanisms does not always lead to improved outcomes and could actually lead to more 
extreme judgments, specifically when audience views are made known (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). It is possible that 
accountability moderates the relationship between the amount of cognitive closure sought 
to support or not support a specific policy, a previously unexplored relationship among 
accountability, political ideology, and choice to pursue specific policy preferences. From 
this, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Ideologically-congruent policy preference is increased when 
accountability is present. 
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Figure 1. Accountability, need for closure, and political ideology full model. 
Accountability moderates the relationship between political ideology and policy 
preferences, such that it increases need for closure on incongruent policy matters.  
 
 
Method 
 
Procedures and Subjects 
 
In this study, subjects were confronted with choosing between two policy 
initiatives that have the same expected value in terms of lives saved.5 Subjects were 
recruited from undergraduate political organizations (e.g., Young Democrats, College 
Republicans) from several major research universities based in the United States. A total 
of 490 subjects answered the survey. Surveys were sent to various student political email 
lists in order to try to balance the ideological perspectives of subjects. The sample 
                                                
5 Issues drawn from http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-4-political-compromise-and-divisive-
policy-debates/ and http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/environment-energy-2/ 
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included 37.3% who self-identified as Democrats, 33.5% who self-identified as 
Republicans, and 18.6% who self-identified as Independent, with the remaining ~10% 
identifying with other parties such as the Green or Libertarian Party. The sample was 
43.1% female and 74.7% Caucasian. All subjects were asked about one of two issues 
(randomized): gun safety and environmental protection. 
 
Design 
The study design was 2x3 full-factorial design, no accountability vs. 
accountability, and low vs. medium vs. high levels of uncertainty. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions. They were asked to imagine that they were a 
small-town mayor who was either up for re-election (accountable) or term-limited (not 
accountable). Accountable subjects were informed that while they were the incumbent in 
the upcoming election (i.e., up for re-election), they faced a stiff challenge from another 
candidate and that while they had won election earlier, their decision would weigh 
heavily on prospects for re-election. The accountability situation in which subjects found 
themselves was essentially accountability to a superior entity, in this case, the voting 
public, whose views were left unknown deliberately (as unknown views tend to generate 
higher levels of deliberate thinking and improved decisions, based on the conclusions 
from the review of accountability literature in Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
Two issues, environmental issues and gun safety, were selected due to their high 
levels of ideological polarization. Subjects were randomly presented with one of three 
value neutral scenarios within each issue. For example, in the environmental clean-up 
scenario, they were told that they had the choice of signing a bill into law that would lead 
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to the probability (90%, 50%, or 10%) of 100 lives saved, or they could not sign the bill 
and spend the money on a hospital that would save 90, 50, or 10 lives, an amount equal to 
the expected value of the environmental clean-up law. Those who were shown the gun 
safety issue were presented with the same choice—to sign into law a gun safety bill that 
would have some probability of saving 100 lives (90%, 50% or 10%) or they could not 
sign the bill and fund a hospital that would save 90, 50, or 10 lives, respectively.6  
Subjects were then asked how likely they were to sign either the gun safety or 
environmental clean-up bill into law. After responding with the likelihood of signing the 
bill into law, subjects were then presented with a follow-on scenario in which they could 
ask for further research into the proposed policy. They were informed that this additional 
research could lead to up to a 10, 50 or 90% increase in the probability of lives saved 
(aligned with the initial level of risk presented). Subjects were then asked how much risk 
reduction they required for them to be 100% likely to sign the bill into law. For the 
complete surveys sent to subjects, see the methodological appendix for Study 3.  
Results 
 We first wanted to see if there were differences in likelihood of policy adoption 
based on ideology. Subjects’ likelihood of enacting policy largely mirrored the initial 
levels of risk regarding the efficacy of the policy. For example, if policy was 90% likely 
to save 100 lives, approximately 90% of subjects supported the policy. This effect 
appeared largely independent of political ideology for the environmental clean-up 
                                                
6 While not the major focus of this study, one would expect the “gain framing” effects (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981) to be significantly dampened, based on the results of follow-on work on framing effects 
in political science (Druckman, 2001a, 2001b).  
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scenario. Ideology did not increase or decrease the average level of support for the 
environmental clean-up policy for Democrats, Republicans, or Independents.  
Only in the gun safety scenario did political ideology effects appear, as those self-
identifying as Republican were 2-12% less likely to pass the bill than both those who 
self-identified as Independents and Democrats. A post hoc Tukey test showed that 
Republicans were less likely to adopt the bill than both Independents (p < .001) and 
Democrats (p = .04). Republicans were more demanding when it came to risk reduction 
requirements for the gun safety bill, requesting between 0.4%-6% reduction in 
uncertainty before having convincing evidence of the policy’s efficacy; however, these 
differences were not significant after conducting a post hoc Tukey test. Likewise, 
Republicans were more demanding when it came to risk reduction requirements for the 
environmental safety bill, where a post hoc Tukey test showed that they requested more 
risk reduction than Independents (p < .037) and Democrats (p < .006). See Tables 1 and 2 
and Figures 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics.  
After taking into account the starting level of risk, ideological effects appeared for 
the gun safety bill, with ideology having a significant effect on the amount of risk 
reduction requested by the subject (F= 5.3(404), p<.005).  Thus, Hypothesis 1 was only 
partially supported, as the anticipated ideological effects appeared only with the gun 
safety issue after controlling for initial levels of uncertainty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
Table 1  
 
Environmental Bill Adoption Likelihoods by Party ID and Desired Risk Reduction 
 
 
Party ID 
Initial Risk 
Level n 
Mean 
Likelihood 
of Adoption 
Mean 
Reduction 
in Risk 
Diff from 
Overall 
Mean 
Likelihood 
Diff from 
Overall 
Mean 
Reduction 
Dem Low 51 75.25 7.88 1.45 0.15 
Dem Medium 55 55.80 39.64 -0.84 2.85 
Dem High 63 31.87 65.06 -3.30 4.26 
Repub Low 47 76.28 8.13 2.47 0.39 
Repub Medium 55 54.78 38.75 -1.86 1.96 
Repub High 53 39.19 64.38 4.02 3.57 
Ind Low 25 69.88 7.20 -3.92 -0.54 
Ind Medium 29 59.34 31.97 2.70 -4.82 
Ind High 31 34.45 52.97 -0.72 -7.84 
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Figure 2. Mean likelihood of policy adoption and risk reduction sought for environmental 
cleanup. Likelihood of adoption generally mirrored the initially presented risk level. 
 
Table 2  
 
Gun Safety Bill Adoption Likelihoods by Party ID and Desired Risk Reduction  
Party ID 
Initial Risk 
Level n 
Mean 
Likelihood 
Mean 
Reduction 
Diff from 
Overall Mean 
Likelihood 
Diff from 
Overall Mean 
Reduction 
Dem Low 44 83.89 7.84 2.91 -0.02 
Dem Medium 57 57.51 39.75 -3.64 -0.44 
Dem High 68 42.35 54.76 1.50 -2.51 
Repub Low 46 78.87 8.30 -2.11 0.44 
Repub Medium 52 58.12 41.23 -3.04 1.04 
Repub High 57 28.28 63.26 -12.57 5.99 
Ind Low 27 80.19 7.44 -0.80 -0.42 
Ind Medium 35 67.83 39.60 6.68 -0.60 
Ind High 23 51.91 53.78 11.06 -3.49 
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Figure 3. Mean likelihood of policy adoption and risk reduction sought for gun safety 
issue. Republicans were generally less likely to seek to adopt gun control legislation and 
sought more risk reduction before preferring it over hospital funding. 
 
To what extent does holding the subject accountable interact with political 
ideology to increase or decrease the amount of cognitive closure (as measured as risk 
reduction) desired by the subject? The interactions were not significant, thus the effects 
of accountability and political ideology were orthogonal even after controlling for initial 
level of risk. Accountability appeared to increase the amount of closure sought in the gun 
safety scenario (p = 0.01) as well as for the environmental clean-up scenario, although in 
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the latter case accountability was only marginally significant (p = .075). See Tables 3 and 
4 for ANOVA results. These results generally support Hypotheses 2 and 3, which posited 
that accountability would exacerbate the amount of risk reduction sought regardless of 
political ideology.   
 
Table 3  
 
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Risk Reduction Sought for 
Environmental Clean-up Issue 
 
  Df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Accountable 1 990 990 3.19 0.075 
Initial Risk Level 2 197469 98735 318.63 0.001*** 
Party ID 2 3244 1622 5.24 0.006** 
Accountable * Party ID 2 1256 628 2.03 0.133 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Table 4 
  
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Risk Reduction Sought for Gun 
Safety Issue 
 
  Df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Accountable 1 2992 2992 6.53 0.011* 
Initial Risk Level 2 168949 84474 184.30 0.001*** 
Party ID 2 1621 811 1.77 0.172 
Accountable * Party ID 2 453 227 0.49 0.61 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
Is initial preference for a policy influenced by an interaction between political 
ideology and accountability (i.e., does holding someone accountable make them more 
likely to adopt politically congruent policies)? The results from the environmental clean-
up issue do not support Hypothesis 4, as the interactions were not significant; however, 
the results from the gun safety issue showed a marginally significant (p<.068) interaction 
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between accountability and ideology on the likelihood of supporting the policy. A post 
hoc Tukey test showed that these marginally significant effects were primarily the result 
of accountable Independents (p = 0.16) and accountable Democrats (p = 0.11) preferring 
less reduction in uncertainty than non-accountable Republicans. Thus, there is partial 
support for Hypothesis 4, which would benefit from further investigation via follow-on 
experiments. See Tables 5 and 6 for full ANOVA results. 
Table 5  
 
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Initial Likelihood of Adoption for 
Environmental Clean-up Issue 
 
  Df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Accountable 1 84 84 0.181 0.671 
Initial Risk Level 2 105441 52720 113.9 0.001*** 
Party ID 2 553 277 0.598 0.551 
Accountable * Party ID 2 589 294 0.636 0.530 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
Table 6  
 
ANOVA for Accountability, Initial Risk and Ideology on Initial Likelihood of Adoption for 
Gun Safety Issue 
 
  Df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Accountable 1 1592 1592 2.763 0.097 
Initial Risk Level 2 118344 59172 102.668 0.001*** 
Party ID 2 7839 3919 6.8 0.001*** 
Accountable * Party ID 2 3121 1560 2.708 0.068 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Discussion 
 The results from Study 3 mostly support the idea that holding subjects 
accountable to the public can exacerbate the extent to which they prefer policies 
congruent with their political beliefs, regardless of the actual efficacy of such policies. 
Subjects were more likely to adopt ideologically-congruent policies when they were held 
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accountable for their actions. Subjects tolerated more risk for politically congruent 
policies than incongruent ones, and accountability pressures mostly exacerbated such 
effects. These findings support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. While there is only weak support 
for Hypothesis 4 and therefore the full model, it is possible that a more politically salient 
issue, such as abortion rights or affirmative action policy, could draw out a stronger 
interaction between accountability and political ideology on the likelihood to support and 
the amount of risk reduction sought for a politically congruent policy.  
Likewise, the use of student samples for this study may understate the size of 
effects from accountability and ideology. First, students who are working on 
undergraduate degrees, and specifically those who were a part of this sample (recruited 
from mostly selective universities with highly active political organizations), may differ 
from their ideological cohort in ways that tamp down the observed effects. Second, 
because these students were recruited from political email lists, they may have been 
primed to answer in more temperate ways, recognizing that their answers would likely be 
scrutinized by someone who knows their political affiliation. Future work should, at a 
minimum, attempt to capture ideology in a more granular way than by using political 
affiliation as a proxy. It should also strive to use a more representative sample of political 
ideologues—perhaps in a manner similar to what polling organizations such as Pew 
Research do when composing their representative samples.  
 There is at least some empirical basis to expect the results in this study. Recent 
work by Daniel Kahan (2016, 2017) demonstrates the strength of political ideology and 
identity on information processing. In fact, Kahan and Corbin (2016) found that the most 
actively open-minded individuals within their ideological camps (liberal or conservative) 
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were also the most polarized in terms of their beliefs on climate change. We should not 
only expect limits on how much additional information processing and gathering we can 
push through accountability mechanisms; we should also expect that, at some point, that 
additional processing will merely reinforce existing beliefs. Simply holding people 
accountable for their thinking will make them more rational or objective forecasters, 
when it could in fact make them more incoherent and polarized instead. Other methods 
must be sought out to improve the quality of reasoning and coherence of thought, 
especially when highly polarized political issues are involved. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Accountability and Overcoming Cognitive Interference Effects 
 
ABSTRACT 
When people are faced with highly ambiguous images, they tend to remain uncertain 
about what they are seeing even as the images are gradually brought into focus. People 
are slow to let go of their uncertainty. Similarly, people tend to underestimate the rate of 
change in the environment when they are in the midst of an event, improperly updating 
their beliefs as new information warrants. Can increases in deliberate processing, spurred 
by accountability pressures, lead people to more quickly recognize an outcome while 
resisting overly volatile updating? In this series of interrelated experiments, subjects were 
asked about the probability of a referendum succeeding in a fictional country after being 
presented with seven pieces of evidence (news updates about the election). In the first 
experiment, subjects viewed these news updates in a purely qualitative format (without 
numeric probabilities associated with the data). Subjects in the second experiment saw 
the evidence accompanied with base rate information, which allowed for Bayesian 
updating. Holding subjects accountable for the reasons supporting their judgments led to 
quicker and more accurate recognition of eventual outcomes and updating that was 
significantly closer to Bayesian norms. 
Keywords: cognitive interference, Bayesian reasoning, process accountability 
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Introduction 
People are frequently blindsided by changing events. Popular culture has many 
different names for this familiar phenomenon: terms referring to indifference to change 
while the change is occurring include the “boiling frog” effect or “creeping” normality 
(Handy, 1995) and using incremental change to lull a target into a non-preferred policy 
position is referred to as “salami tactics” (Lieberthal, 2005). Conversely, people generally 
cover their dissonant tracks by defaulting to hindsight bias or creeping determinism. 
Instead of remembering the uncertainty that came with initial forecasts and judgments, 
events seem more probable— or, at the extremes, inevitable— once an outcome is known 
(Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; 
Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). Not anticipating or recognizing change is a 
topic frequently discussed by judgment and decision-making scholars because it 
demonstrates deviation from normative guidelines for integrating new information with 
existing beliefs.  
 There are several candidate theories for this phenomenon, each of which would 
predict that people might not thoroughly foresee or understand incremental change from 
moment to moment and in the aggregate. One explanation is informational: people have a 
tendency to assimilate information in a biased way. If one’s starting position is that 
change will not occur, then only evidence to that effect will be readily accepted into 
existing mental models of the world (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Biased assimilation is 
essentially bipolar: if one’s starting position is that change will occur, then overweighting 
the evidentiary value of new information suggesting change might occur. Other 
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explanations include the tendency towards status quo bias where “no change” is a 
“default” mental setting (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 
1988). At a more micro-level, anchoring bias operates, likely the result of selective 
accessibility (Furnham & Boo, 2011; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Kahneman, 1992; 
Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When compared to 
the normative standard of Bayes Theorem, people typically have trouble updating their 
beliefs properly, making too large of updates in light of a strong prior probability, or too 
small of updates in light of a weak prior probability (Edwards, 1968; Massey & Wu, 
2005; Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998). 
 Misinterpreting incremental change can also be due to informational pseudo-
diagnosticity (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979) – that is, newly received 
information could be non-diagnostic or minimally-diagnostic. Within cognitive and 
perceptual psychology, this has sometimes been referred to as perceptual interference 
(Bruner & Potter, 1964). Bruner and Potter (1964) showed that subjects trying to visually 
identify objects became progressively worse as initial levels of blurriness were increased. 
Subjects saw objects as they were gradually brought into focus and those who saw 
extremely blurry objects initially had greater difficulty correctly identifying the objects. 
Bruner and Potter’s findings suggest that more initial uncertainty leads subjects to 
interpret additional information as less diagnostic. Bruner and Potter’s explanation for 
subject behavior centered around the additional hypothesis testing that subjects had to do 
in order to correctly ascertain the identity of the object. However, more recent research 
has called that explanation into question while still replicating the perceptual interference 
effects (Snodgrass & Hirshman, 1991). This more recent work has focused on transient 
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activation or priming as an explanatory mechanism, akin to a kind of anchoring on 
uncertainty. 
While perceptual interference has been briefly addressed in the cognitive 
psychology literature, it has received almost zero attention in the domain of judgment and 
decision-making. Given the robustness of the other heuristics and biases mentioned 
earlier, we might expect cognitive interference effects when people are integrating 
information that demonstrates incremental change.  
One normatively prescribed way that high and low starting levels of certainty can 
be interpreted is as strong vs. weak priors. A strong prior, in this case, refers to a small 
degree of first-order uncertainty, whereas a weak prior refers to a high degree of first-
order uncertainty. According to Bayes theorem, the same piece of evidence should have 
more sway in the low certainty (weak prior) condition than in the high certainty (strong 
prior) condition (Augenblick & Rabin, 2013). Bruner and Potter’s results run opposite to 
this prediction, giving a reasonable basis for calling this behavior an “error” which 
accountability mechanisms can correct. 
From this, we derive the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: When subjects encounter a strong prior, they will make large 
updates to their beliefs after exposure to new stimuli, relative to subjects that 
initially encounter a weak prior.   
Hypothesis 2: When subjects encounter a weak prior, they will make small 
updates to their beliefs after exposure to new stimuli, relative to subjects that 
initially encounter a strong prior.  
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Can these cognitive interference effects be overcome by additional deliberate 
processing? Other scholars have successfully debiased hindsight effects and status quo 
bias with strategies such as “considering the opposite” (Arkes et al., 1988; Hoffrage et al., 
2000). Still others have shown that holding subjects accountable for their judgments has 
also improved the quality of judgments (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; 
Tetlock & Kim, 1987).  Some types of process accountability which spur greater levels of 
deliberate processing should thus help mitigate this error. Control subjects will put less 
weight on evidence in the face of a weak prior and a lot of emphasis on evidence when 
facing a strong prior—contrary to the prescriptions of Bayes’ theorem. When subjects are 
accountable, this effect should be flipped, which suggests that conscious deliberation 
helps participants to act like naïve Bayesians. 
From this, we derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Process accountability reduces the magnitude of cognitive 
interference effects, such that probabilistic estimates made under conditions of 
high and low certainty will have less error.  
 
 
Method 
Procedure and Subjects 
The study was conducted via two experiments. Both experiments were full 
factorial 2x2 designs: accountable vs. not accountable and strong vs. weak prior 
probability. In Experiment 1 (N=246), undergraduate subjects were recruited and 
completed the experiment for class credit. Over 98% of the subjects were between the 
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ages of 18-24, the sample was 57% female and 54% Caucasian. In Experiment 2 
(N=366), undergraduate subjects were recruited and also completed the experiment for 
class credit. Over 99% of the subjects were between the ages of 18-24, the sample was 
59% female and 50% Caucasian. 
Design 
In both experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions and presented the same scenario based on the 2014 Scottish referendum for 
independence. The referendum was a popular vote which would decide whether Scotland 
would remain a part of the United Kingdom. This referendum resulted in a victory for 
those who held the “anti-independence” or status quo position. 
Seven news items from the referendum were fictionalized and presented to 
subjects in the same order that they occurred in the real world. In Experiment 1, subjects 
in the weak prior condition were told that the chances of the “pro-independence” camp 
winning the referendum were 50/50, but that there were many weeks until the vote was to 
take place. Those in the strong prior condition were told that the “anti-independence” 
camp had a significant lead over the “pro-independence” camp. The same initial 
information was presented to subjects in Experiment 2, along with numeric probabilities. 
Subjects were informed that the chances of the “pro-independence” camp winning were 
50% in the weak prior condition and 90% in the strong prior condition.  
In both experiments, subjects were subsequently presented with the same seven 
pieces of evidence, in the same order, and were asked for likelihood estimates (numeric) 
on whether the “pro-independence” camp would win the referendum after each new piece 
of evidence was presented. In the accountable conditions, subjects were asked to explain 
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the reasoning behind their estimates. After viewing a piece of evidence, subjects 
encountered a text box that posed the question, “Why did you assign the probability that 
you assigned? Please explain your rationale in a sentence or more.” Subjects in the 
accountable conditions saw this query and text box a total of seven times. In Experiment 
1, subjects were simply given the textual information and left on their own to decide what 
would be reasonable probability estimates. In Experiment 2, subjects received base rate 
information (other referendums that have occurred within the country of Apple) 
regarding the probability of the referendum being successful, given that they had just 
viewed a new piece of information. From this information, subjects could conduct 
Bayesian inference and calculate a normatively correct answer per Bayes theorem, if they 
so chose. For the complete study materials, see the methodological appendix for Study 4. 
Results 
Experiment 1 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we examined how much a participant’s judgment 
shifted in response to each new piece of evidence. We calculated the average change in 
response to new information (on an absolute basis, since the estimate could go up or 
down) between a participant’s initial and final probabilistic estimates. We used 
percentage change because subjects in the strong prior condition had less “room” to move 
their estimates upwards, while those in the weak prior condition had more “room” for 
shifting their estimates up or down. We refer to this measure as average change in belief. 
A low change in belief suggests that a participant was not swayed much by new evidence, 
sticking closely with their original estimate. In contrast, a high change in belief suggests 
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that a participant was significantly influenced by new evidence, deviating from their 
original estimate.   
We first sought to examine whether strength of prior affected belief updating 
behavior. A two-sample t-test was conducted on average change in belief to see if there 
was a significant difference in change in belief between the weak and strong prior 
conditions. Beliefs in the strong prior condition were more labile, averaging 11% shifts 
from the start to the end of the experiment, compared to nearly negligible shifts from 
beginning to end for the low prior participants (M = 0.3%). Both strong prior and weak 
prior subjects exhibited cognitive interference effects; strong prior subjects shifted wildly 
and those initially encountering weak priors hardly shifted at all. These results are 
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. See Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
 
T-Test of Average Change in Beliefs by Condition Aggregating Percent Changes After 
Being Presented with Each New Piece of Evidence in Experiment 1 
 Condition     
 Weak Prior  Strong Prior     
 
M  n  M  n 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval t df p 
Average 
Change 
(%) 
0.3%  123  11.11%  123 -12.73, -10.10 
-
17.135 178.38 <0.001*** 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of certainty on belief updating throughout 
the course of the experiment, t-tests were conducted on changes to the reported 
probability of referendum success for each time a subject received a new piece of 
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evidence between the two conditions. The results from this examination show that 
changes in reported probability by condition were not significant, with the exception of 
the shifts from starting level of probability (90% in the strong prior condition and 50% in 
the weak prior condition) after viewing Evidence 1. See Table 2 and Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
T-Tests of Average Percent Change in Beliefs by Strength of Prior After Each Being 
Presented With New Evidence in Experiment 1 
 Condition     
 Weak Prior  Strong Prior     
 Mean %   n  
Mean 
%  n 
95% Confidence 
Interval t df p 
After viewing 
evidence 1 8.2  123  47.5  123 -41.86, -36.71 -30.1 233.64 .001*** 
After viewing 
evidence 2 10.6  123  10.5  123 -2.31, 2.38 0.03 267.82 .974 
After viewing 
evidence 3 11.9  123  13.9  123 -5.33, 1.08 -1.3 259.80 .193 
After viewing 
evidence 4 13.7  123  14.7  123 -4.16, 2.17 -0.61 269.15 .537 
After viewing 
evidence 5 9.3  123  9.2  123 -2.52, 2.71 0.06 271.98 .945 
After viewing 
evidence 6 10.4  123  9.0  123 -0.78, 3.48 1.25 264.09 .213 
After viewing 
evidence 7 7.2  123  6.4  123 -1.28, 2.85  0.74 261.76 .455 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Figure 1.  Average percent changes (absolute) in probability estimates in Experiment 1 
from presentation of one piece of evidence to the next, starting with shift from evidence 1 
to 2. Subjects in the strong prior condition reacted more strongly to new information than 
subjects in the weak prior condition; however, the differences here were not significant, 
with the exception of shifts from initial starting probability to estimate after evidence 1. 
 
How does accountability influence belief-updating behavior? To test Hypothesis 3, we 
ran an analysis of variance of the interaction between type of prior and accountability on 
total change in belief of reported probability of referendum success from the beginning of 
the experiment to the end. The beliefs of accountable subjects in the strong prior 
condition were less labile than those in the weak prior condition, providing partial 
support to Hypothesis 3. See Table 3.  
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Table 3 
ANOVA of Average Change in Belief, Strength of Prior, and Accountability with 
Interaction Term in Experiment 1 
Source Df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Strength of Prior 1 0 0.34 0.02 0.901 
Accountability 1 45 44.95 2.05 0.153 
Prior * Accountability 1 91 90.92 4.42 0.04*  
Residuals 284 6222 21.91   
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
The interaction can be more clearly seen graphically. A strong prior alone, when 
compared to a weak prior, makes participants deviate more from their original estimate, 
per Table 1. However, when accountability is introduced, we see that those in the weak 
prior condition began to deviate more, while those in the strong prior condition deviated 
less. These data support Hypothesis 3. Accountability did reduce the magnitude of 
cognitive interference effects in both the strong and weak prior conditions. See Figure 2. 
For a graphical representation of how subjects reacted after viewing each piece of 
evidence, see Figure 3.  
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Figure 2. Accountability effects interact with strength of prior in Experiment 1. Holding 
subjects accountable decreased the size of the belief updates in the strong prior scenario 
and increased the size of their updates in the weak prior scenario. Error bars represent 
standard errors.   
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Figure 3. Accountability effects interact with strength of prior in Experiment 1. Holding 
subjects accountable decreased the size of the belief updates in the strong prior scenario 
and increased the size of their updates in the weak prior scenario. 
 
 
In the no-accountability (control) condition, participants make the error of 
overweighting the diagnostic value of new evidence against a strong prior and 
underweighting it when encountering a weak prior. In the accountability conditions, this 
behavior switches to match the normative prescription: to put more stock in new evidence 
when viewed in light of a weak prior versus a strong prior. 
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Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 1, subjects were free to assign probabilities as best they saw fit. In 
Experiment 2, belief updating based on Bayesian inference served as a normative 
benchmark for subjects. Subjects were provided with base rate information which they 
could use to derive properly updated estimates. To again test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
examined the difference between a participant’s initial and final probabilistic estimate. A 
two-sample t-test was conducted on average change in belief to see if there was a 
significant difference in change in belief between the low and high certainty conditions. 
Subjects in the strong prior condition were more volatile, averaging 3% shifts from the 
start to the end of the experiment compared to nearly negligible shifts from beginning to 
end for the low certainty participants. So, while weak prior condition subjects did exhibit 
behavior consistent with Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 1 was again unsupported. See Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4 
 
T-Test of Average Absolute Percent Change in Beliefs by Condition Aggregating Percent 
Changes After Being Presented with Each New Piece of Evidence in Experiment 2 
 Condition     
 Weak Prior  Strong Prior     
 Mean 
%  n  
Mean 
%  n 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval t df p 
Avg 
Percent 
Change 
(absolute) 
1.07  178  1.30  188 -0.35, -0.12 -3.92 364 
<.001 
*** 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
To gain a deeper understanding of the effect of certainty on belief updating throughout 
the course of Experiment 2, t-tests were conducted on changes to the reported probability 
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of referendum success for each time a subject received a new piece of evidence. The 
results from this examination show that changes in reported probability by condition were 
significantly different when updating beliefs after seeing evidence instance number 2. See 
Table 5 and Figure 4. 
 
Table 5 
 
T-Test Average Change in Beliefs by Condition After Each Being Presented With New 
Evidence in Experiment 2 
 Condition     
 
Weak Prior 
(Absolute 
values) 
 
Strong Prior 
(Absolute 
values) 
   
 
 
Mean %  n  Mean %  n 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval t df p 
After viewing 
evidence 2 14.09  188  4.13  178 -0.34, -0.03 -2.34 214 0.02* 
After viewing 
evidence 3 22.34  188  15.38  178 -0.16, 0.02 -1.57 345 0.12 
After viewing 
evidence 4 172.52  188  56.56  178 -0.84, 3.16 1.15 181 0.25 
After viewing 
evidence 5 88.79  188  114.08  178 -0.88, 0.37 -0.80 334 0.42 
After viewing 
evidence 6 5.01  188  7.37  178 -0.38, 0.33 -0.13 285 0.89 
After viewing 
evidence 7 80.21  188  55.36  178 -1.06, 0.57 -0.60 307 0.55 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
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Figure 4. Average percent change in probability estimates in Experiment 2. In the weak 
prior scenario, subjects reacted more strongly to evidence 4 and in the strong prior 
scenario they reacted more strongly to evidence 5.  
 
How does accountability influence belief updating behavior? To test Hypothesis 3 again, 
we ran an analysis of variance of the interaction between strength of prior and 
accountability on total change in belief of reported probability of referendum success 
from the beginning of the experiment to the end. Accountable subjects who were 
provided with a strong prior made less volatile estimates providing partial support to 
Hypothesis 3. See Table 3.  
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Table 6 
 
ANOVA of Average Change in Belief, Strength of Prior,  
and Accountability with Interaction Term in Experiment 2 
Source Df SS MS F Pr(>F) 
Strength of Prior 1 0.012 0.0117 1.55 0.214 
Accountability 1 0.029 0.029 3.82 0.051 
Prior * 
Accountability 1 
0.029 0.029 3.87 0.050* 
Residuals 362 2.737 0.00756   
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 
 
 
The interaction can be more clearly seen graphically. Strong prior alone, when compared 
to a weak prior, is associated with participants deviating more from each estimate, per 
Experiment 1. However, when held accountable, those in the strong prior condition, on 
average, deviated less; however, weak prior subjects (also accountable) did not deviate 
more, on average.  In Experiment 2, this pattern partially supports Hypothesis 3. 
Accountability did reduce the magnitude of cognitive interference effects, but only when 
participants were in a condition of strong prior. In Experiment 2, subjects in the weak 
prior condition did not experience a significant exacerbation of belief shifting in 
judgments when held accountable. See Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Accountability effects interact with strength of prior in Experiment 2. Weak 
prior on the right and strong prior on the left. Accountability led to larger updates in the 
weak prior scenario and smaller updates in the strong prior scenario. 
 
 
How did subjects perform compared to an ideal observer updating according to 
Bayes’ theorem? The major change in belief from optimally Bayesian behavior came 
when subjects encountered evidence 3, updating their beliefs after considering evidence 
2. See Figure 6. The change in belief for those who were held accountable in the strong 
prior condition was much less than it was for those in the weak prior condition.  
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Figure 6. Comparing actual belief updating to Bayesian inference ideal in Experiment 2. 
In the weak prior scenario (purple dashed line), belief updates should be larger while in 
the strong prior scenario (yellow dashed line), belief updates should be smaller.   
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Figure 7. Comparing accountable subjects to non-accountable subjects in Experiment 2. 
In the weak prior no accountability scenario (blue dashed line), belief updates were 
larger than the accountable subjects (blue solid line) while in the strong prior 
accountable scenario (red solid line), belief updates were smaller in 4 out of 7 instances.   
 
Figure 6 illustrates how subjects should behave versus how they did behave when 
encountering a weak or strong prior. When encountering a strong prior conveyed by a 
higher starting level of certainty, subjects should have shifted their beliefs in a more 
gradual manner (i.e., the dashed yellow is less strongly influenced by evidence than the 
dashed purple line). Figure 7 illustrates how subjects in the strong prior accountable 
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condition behaved in a more Bayesian manner while subjects in the weak prior 
accountable condition did not. Accountability did not have consistent effects in 
Experiment 2.  
Another way of examining this difference is by doing a paired regression 
coefficients analysis. I examined whether subjects in the strong prior condition made 
more gradual updates than those in in the weak prior condition. This is not the case, as 
seen by the positive values in the last column of Table 7. Subjects did not behave in an 
optimally Bayesian way. 
Table 7  
Paired Regression Coefficients Comparison Between Weak vs. Strong Prior Conditions 
Predicting Changes in Beliefs After Viewing Each Piece of Evidence 
	 Weak Prior Coeff (abs) Strong Prior Coeff (abs) Difference After Ev 1 0.061 0.019 -0.042 
After Ev 2 0.059 0.070 0.011 
After Ev 3 0.084 0.134 0.050 
After Ev 4 0.027 0.055 0.028 
After Ev 5 0.006 0.086 0.080 
After Ev 6 0.077 0.136 0.059 
After Ev 7 0.039 0.033 -0.006 
 
Based on these results, it appears that accountability’s effect on belief updating is not 
sufficient to overcome the natural tendency of not updating in a Bayesian manner. In the 
case of subjects starting with a weak prior, accountability led to larger magnitude updates 
in 4 out of 7 belief update episodes; and in the case of starting with a strong prior, being 
accountable led to smaller magnitude updates in 4 out of 7 belief update episodes. See 
Table 8. 
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Table 8  
Paired Regression Coefficients Comparison Between Weak vs. Strong Priors Conditions 
w/ and w/o Accountability 
	 Weak Prior Coeff (abs) Strong Prior Coeff (abs) Weak Diff Strong Diff 
 
No Acc Acc No Acc Acc   
After Ev 1 0.067 0.076 0.024 0.012 0.008 -0.012 
After Ev 2 0.025 0.044 0.057 0.104 0.018 0.047 
After Ev 3 0.068 0.069 0.129 0.143 0.001 0.015 
After Ev 4 0.024 0.014 0.061 0.045 -0.010 -0.016 
After Ev 5 0.048 0.028 0.095 0.081 -0.020 -0.014 
After Ev 6 0.000 0.129 0.151 0.095 0.129 -0.057 
After Ev 7 0.097 0.024 0.027 0.052 -0.073 0.025 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In general, there is support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, which posited that subjects 
would update too strongly after encountering a strong prior and too weakly after 
encountering a weak prior. However, the results of these two experiments present a 
mixed picture for the ability of process accounting to help overcome cognitive 
interference effects. Process accountable subjects were able to mitigate the effects of 
cognitive interference consistently in Experiment 1 but only in the case of encountering a 
strong prior in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, accountable subjects who encountered a 
weak prior did not make larger magnitude shifts in beliefs. In large part, we replicated the 
cognitive interference effects and showed accountability to be helpful, but not a panacea. 
These results show how hard it is for people to be Bayesian processors of 
information and to update beliefs in a manner that is close to Bayesian standards. Process 
accountability is not capable of helping in all instances, although one could consider the 
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results from these two studies to be the lower bound limit on accountability effects, since 
the intervention was so minimal. Future work should focus on just how much closer 
people can approach the Bayesian standard when they are incentivized to do so, and feel 
the pressure to perform in a more deliberate and considered manner. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 Accountability may be an inevitable feature of social life, but the paradoxical 
popular picture painted of it shows a polarized perception of its efficacy. Accountability 
system perception sometimes depends on ideological factors, which predict when liberals 
and conservatives prefer process or outcome accounting (Tetlock, Vieider, Patil, & Grant, 
2013). More generally, the popular rhetoric often simply calls for “more of it” (usually 
when things have gone wrong) and the targets of accountability often levy responses of 
“we have enough already.” But accountability need not always be used as a blunt 
instrument for forced compliance. The anticipation of being of held responsible, either for 
process or outcomes, can have effects on judgments and decisions that are desirable or 
less than desirable depending on the specific context of task for which responsibility must 
be taken. The key takeaway from the collection of studies presented here is that 
accountability type should be calibrated to match the situations that the accountable find 
themselves in. 
 One of these situational contexts is environmental validity, or the extent to which 
there is predictability. When there is a tight coupling between following a process and 
achieving the desired aims, finding and following the process should outperform other 
forms of accountability (and not being held accountable). However, if an environment is 
sufficiently random, we should expect process accountability to degrade performance 
since the hunt for non-existent “best practices” leads to wasted effort and errors of 
commission. The dual-edged nature of process accountability became evident from the 
results of Study 1. The key is for leaders, decision-makers, and employees alike to 
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recognize and gauge just how much randomness there is in the operating environment 
and design accountability systems accordingly, to the extent that doing so is possible.  
 Another important situational context is the political environment. Anticipation of 
evaluation by the outcome-biased public can lead policymakers to choices that are 
considered sub-optimal by decision theorists. Researchers and scientists have encouraged 
policymakers to use numeric probabilities because they are more precise, but vague 
verbal ones can offer a buffer against an unfair evaluation by voters. Study 2 showed that 
by considering the alternative functions of probabilistic statements, such as political 
signaling, the precision that comes along with numeric probabilities does not necessarily 
hold the highest utility value. Less defensible are the shifts in the amount of uncertainty 
tolerated for ideologically congruent policy choices. Study 3 shows how accountability 
pressure can exacerbate our tendency to prefer policies consistent with our ideological 
beliefs, despite the value (positive or negative) associated with those policies.  
 Sometimes, holding people accountable for their reasoning is not enough to 
overcome biases in thinking. Study 4 showed that accountability reduced cognitive 
interference effects and improved Bayesian thinking only some of the time. Previous 
research showed that because being a proper Bayesian can be difficult, without prior 
instruction on how to do it, simply mixing in more deliberate processing isn’t enough to 
make the Bayesian cake rise.  
 This dissertation is intended to start a conversation on how situations can shape 
the kinds of accountability systems we design. For example, in Study 1, prescriptions of 
process or outcome systems depend on the randomness of the environment encountered – 
but what if there is little or no feedback on the level of randomness (i.e., vast temporal 
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distance between event and outcome, such as starting a dissertation and defending it), or 
when the feedback is simply so noisy or inconsistent that it is impossible to say? Perhaps, 
as suggested by Chang et al. (2017), the solution is to prescribe a hybrid accountability 
approach and see if it generates both faster recognition of patterns while tamping down 
error commission in random environments. Depending on the environment, a hybrid 
approach could be the best of both worlds—or the worst—and we won’t know until we 
test. A follow-up to Study 1 would include extending the total number of trials to see if 
the observed divergence in effects holds up and also to test to see if the learning effects of 
outcome vs. process remain stable. In Study 2, another reason posited for why decision-
makers should use numeric probabilities is that they are better able to learn from more 
granular feedback. Yet, to date, no one has conducted a study demonstrating that numeric 
probabilities lead to improved levels of learning (such as becoming better calibrated at 
making estimates)—essentially that there are other normatively justifiable reasons for 
preferring numeric probabilities over verbal ones.  
There are more than a few other contexts to explore and many more if we want to 
develop a comprehensive theory regarding the “ecological” context of accountability. 
One such contextual element is time pressure. Not often a deliberately manipulated 
variable in experiments (unless it is the experimental variable in question), time pressure 
is nevertheless as ubiquitous as accountability. No one can escape the march of time, yet 
time pressure has become a neglected element of psychological experimentation 
(Svenson & Maule, 1993). Yet, process accountability proponents, backed by empirical 
data collected in the lab that supports their position, see process as an unalloyed good. 
However, after taking time pressure into account, the downsides of following or 
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anticipating evaluation for process becomes clear. Perhaps a myopic focus on process 
steps ultimately leads to judgments and decisions that are incomplete or too late. 
Executing a process can also be expensive in terms of cognitive and time resources—and 
it is possible that the recommended process is not the best one that there is or even very 
good. Being accountable for outcomes could reveal alternative, faster and better 
pathways to achieving desired goals. Such exploration would be limited by strict process 
adherence. 
 A second situational component has to do with the incentives found in 
accountability systems, chiefly the repercussions of not following through with 
accountability dictates. Within the accountability literature, laboratory experiments 
typically do not punish subjects or subject them to costs, yet in the real-world, non-
compliance can lead to the loss of property, a job, and sometimes even life. Within 
reason, laboratory experiments can begin to explore how costs and punishments 
associated with accountability systems influence how people perform. 
A third potential study continuation is to connect how accountability systems and 
environmental validity interact with a group’s error propensity. Groups make many of the 
most consequential decisions in modern society. Psychologists and behavioral economists 
have long studied the risk propensities of individuals and how people behave in risky 
situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Earlier and relatively inconclusive work 
on the “risky shift” phenomenon cataloged instances where individuals make more risky 
choices when put into groups (Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wallach, 
Kogan, & Bem, 1962; Yates, 1992; Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin, & Loh, 1970; Zajonc, 
Wolosin, Wolosin, & Sherman, 1968). Group discussion and familiarization were 
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identified as drivers of this behavior, which could also induce “cautious” shifts in some 
cases (Fraser, 1971; Fraser, Gouge, & Billig, 1971; Stroebe & Fraser, 1971). Others 
contested these findings by showing that some results were experimentally induced 
(Willems & Clark III, 1969).  
Research into group polarization subsumed the risky and cautious shift research 
program, as polarization of decision-making in groups encompassed the specific cases of 
changing risk tolerances (Isenberg, 1986; Myers & Lamm, 1976; Zuber, Crott, & Werner, 
1992).  Group polarization is said to have occurred when group processes push the initial 
position of a group further in the direction of that position (Isenberg, 1986).  In essence, 
group processes cause group opinions to become more extreme (Sia, Tan, & Wei, 2002). 
Group polarization phenomenon is of interest because it is an example where individual 
opinions are counter-conformist, in that instead of converging on the group average, the 
group’s opinions are pushed away from it (Isenberg, 1986). Group polarization explains 
the existence of non-optimal group decisions as a result of social processes such as the 
Abilene Paradox and is consistent with the research on pluralistic ignorance. Researchers 
have found that group opinions shift as a result of persuasive argumentation, social 
comparison processes, and power distribution inequality among group members, and 
attentional focus on group norms and membership (Friedkin, 1999; Hinsz & Davis, 1984; 
Mackie, 1986; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990).  
Overall, limited work has been done in showing how groups balance the risks of 
errors of omission and commission, since the focus has been on the mechanisms 
underlying each specific kind of error propensity. An extension of Study 1 would allow 
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us to test whether and which types of accountability systems can improve group 
performance. 
 Finally, we should also seek to answer how individual differences influence the 
ways people behave under accountability, since some people thrive and others struggle to 
survive under accountability. Better understanding of individual differences in 
performance might lead to better-calibrated systems of accountability at the individual 
level. In study 1 of the dissertation, individuals who scored highly on measures of AOMT 
performed better under conditions of process accountability than less open-minded 
individuals under conditions of accountability, even when average performance in the 
process condition was lower than that under outcome. This potentially occurs because 
subjects who score highly on open-mindedness are better able to flexibly move away 
from strict versions of process accountability that lead to unhelpful attentional narrowing. 
AOMT is just one of the individual differences that could shape how people operate 
under different accountability schemes. A keener understanding of who thrives, who 
survives, and who wilts under different forms of accountability can also lead to better 
calibrated rule regimes. 
 
The Big Picture 
 To date, studies of accountability have focused on “small” applications of a 
psychological force that tends to produce medium to large effects on participants. 
Whether it be hiring a hypothetical candidate, or a fictional scenario determining 
financial aid awards, or figuring out which hypothetical fund to invest in, many of these 
laboratory examinations of the impact of being held accountable feature tasks that have 
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an ex ante correct answer. In a recent review of accountability studies that encompassed a 
total of 187 experiments, over 70% of them tested process accountability and a great 
many of those included tasks where the experimenters knew or invented the right answer. 
That, of course, is not usually the case in the real world, where uncertainty is ever 
present. So while the accountability literature certainly rates highly on some forms of 
validity (chiefly construct and internal validity), it is at least somewhat lacking in external 
validity. The disconnect here can be a narrow river or a wide gulf depending on which 
perspective is taken—certainly the popular rhetoric regarding the efficacy of 
accountability has not been much impacted by the nuanced and clever experiments that 
have taken place thus far. While there have been some nascent attempts to bridge this 
divide, Flinders (2014) notes that the future of accountability studies depends on how 
societally relevant it is and states, “at the core of this debate is a concern that in recent 
decades the incentives surrounding academic life have emphasized esoteric specialization 
and impenetrable publications over public engagement.”7    
This series of studies has been, to the extent that they were successful, an exercise 
in bridging the gap. For example, even if the experimenter knew ex ante which condition 
would present itself in the London Quadrants task from Study 1, there still was no way of 
guaranteeing the highest possible score on any attempt. In Studies 2, 3, and 4, participants 
grappled with scenarios drawn from the real world, and in some cases pressures to make 
decisions came from publics. Much latitude lies with the experimenter to develop 
materials that are contextually rich. And this is not an argument for more field studies or 
quasi-experiments—each methodology has its pluses and minuses. Laboratory studies 
                                                
7 See also: Julie Beck, “The Challenges of Holding Government Accountable”, The Atlantic, January 2017. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/government-accountability-psychology/512888/ 
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still provide clear advantages to the much messier environs of police departments, 
military units, or year-long forecasting tournaments.  
The insights from Study 1 are particularly useful to our understanding of the kinds 
of accountability that might be helpful. Consider two cases: a police officer on patrol and 
an intelligence analyst writing a report. There is a raging debate over whether officers 
should wear body-worn cameras (BWC), essentially a form of extreme accountability via 
close and persistent monitoring. Every move made by the officers is recorded. On most 
days, police officers encounter fairly routine issues: traffic citations, responding to noise 
complaints, etc. During these times, they are often called on to behave in a procedurally 
consistent manner and following proper procedure is what is evaluated. However, in what 
are fairly rare moments, police officers must decide whether someone is a threat or not. 
Here, our recommendations diverge based on the likelihood of the perceived threat being 
an actual threat. There are hundreds of cases annually of “officer involved shootings” and 
in these cases, more than half of those who were shot by officers were armed while 
around 5% were unarmed (and therefore likely not life-threatening). On the face of it, the 
error rate demonstrates that officers are actually fairly well-versed at distinguishing 
between real and not-real threats. However, the high-profile cases that have seized the 
public consciousness (and rightfully so, given the egregious mistakes committed) have 
led to calls for all police to be equipped with camera technology. One could imagine that 
the overall impact might actually be harmful: officers might feel reticent to take 
justifiable action because of potential outcome bias on the part of the public. The overall 
effect might be more criminals getting away with crime and reduced officer safety, rather 
than the positive accountability effects (e.g., better judgment and threat identification) 
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body-camera proponents believe will occur. This effect might be balanced out by camera 
technology weeding out officers who know that they can no longer get away with 
discriminatory and abusive behavior—but we should pay close attention to what the net 
effect of the policy might be. 
In a similar vein, intelligence analysts are mostly evaluated for following the 
“right” process (Chang & Tetlock, 2016; Chang, Berdini, Mandel & Tetlock, 2017). Yet, 
there is good reason to think that recent efforts to push analysts towards greater 
consideration of outcome accountability might be warranted. Perhaps the target sets that 
analysts deal with exhibit much more randomness and complexity than any process could 
ever account for—or perhaps there are some target sets that are more predictable than 
that. There might not be a one-size-fits-all accountability system that works for the entire 
U.S. intelligence community: those trying to sniff out terrorist plots may be better served 
by an outcome accountability regime than those trying to predict the future of the 
European Union. For the most part, discussions around accountability systems are not 
considerate of environmental concerns. Perhaps, with more research, they will be. One 
can only hope that the research in this dissertation gets us started down this path. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
 
Study 1 
 
Elicitation Platforms for London Quadrants task 
Individual Subject View 
 
 
 
 
Subject View 
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Study 2 
 
 
Experiment 1 (Actor preferences for vague or precise probability expression) 
 
Design: 2 x 2 factorial design, verbal vs. numeric probabilities, high likelihood vs. low 
likelihood 
Subjects were asked a series of questions via electronic survey 
 
Section 1 
 
 
High probability: On Christmas Eve, you receive intelligence reports that indicate that 
terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack.  
Your advisors are pushing you to issue a warning to the American public. Choose the 
preferred way you would like to express your warning to the public. 
(Randomized order of presentation) 
Numeric: Indicate there is a 70% probability that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a 
bomb attack. 
Verbal: Indicate that terrorists are likely targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack. 
 
Low probability: On Christmas Eve, you receive intelligence reports that indicate that 
terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack.  
Your advisors are pushing you to issue a warning to the American public. Choose the 
preferred way you would like to express your warning to the public. 
(Randomized order of presentation) 
Numeric: Indicate there is a 20% probability that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a 
bomb attack. 
Verbal: Indicate that terrorists are unlikely to be targeting US aircraft for a bomb attack. 
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Section 2 
 
Question: You do not take this situation lightly. Your advisors believe the only way to 
mitigate a devastating attack is to ground all passenger aircraft.  
Based on the information you have received thus far, do you believe that you should take 
this course of action? (Yes/No) 
a. Yes: You decide to ground all aircraft.   
b. No: You decide not to ground any aircraft. 
Question: Do you feel that you were justified in taking this action? (1 not justified at all, 
7 completely justified) 
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts) 
 
 
Section 3 
 
After this stage, subjects are randomly assigned questions the outcome observed.  
a. Action / Positive outcome (True Positive):  You grounded all aircraft and several 
terrorists were arrested on their way to Chicago O'Hare airport. The media reports that a 
successful attack would have cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
b. Action / Negative outcome (False Positive): You grounded all aircraft and the threat 
was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the grounding of all flights cost the 
U.S. economy $100 billion.  
c. Inaction / Positive outcome (True Negative): You decided NOT to ground any aircraft 
and the threat was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the grounding of all 
flights cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
 133 
d. Inaction / Negative outcome (False Negative): You decided NOT to ground any 
aircraft and a flight departing Chicago O'Hare airport exploded over Lake Michigan, 
killing 298 individuals aboard. The media reports that the resulting panic from the 
successful attack cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
 
Question: To what extent do you feel you took the right action? (1 worst decision 
possible, 7 best decision possible) 
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts) 
 
Experiment 2 General Public  
 
Section 1 
 
a. Verbal high: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that 
intelligence reports indicate it is likely that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a bomb 
attack.  
b. Numeric high: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that 
intelligence reports indicate there is a 70% probability that terrorists are targeting US 
aircraft for a bomb attack.  
c. Verbal low: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that 
intelligence reports indicate it is unlikely that terrorists are targeting US aircraft for a 
bomb attack.  
d. Numeric low: On Christmas Eve, the President of the United States announces that 
intelligence reports indicate there is a 20% probability that terrorists are targeting US 
aircraft for a bomb attack.  
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Question: The President does not take this situation lightly. His advisors believe the only 
way to mitigate a devastating attack is to ground all passenger aircraft. Based on the 
information you have received thus far, how justified do you believe the President would 
be if the President decided to ground all passenger aircraft in response to this threat? (1 
completely unjustified / 7 completely justified) 
 
Section 2 
 
Then the subjects are randomly assigned into worlds where the President did or did not 
take action: 
a. Action: The President decided to ground all aircraft.   
b. Inaction: The President decided not to ground any aircraft. 
Question: To what extent is the President justified in taking this action? (1 completely 
unjustified, 7 completely justified) 
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts) 
After this stage, subjects are randomly assigned questions the outcome observed.  
Section 3 
 
a. Action / Positive outcome (True Positive):  The President grounded all aircraft and 
several terrorists were arrested on their way to Chicago O'Hare airport. The media reports 
that a successful attack would have cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
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b. Action / Negative outcome (False Positive): The President grounded all aircraft and the 
threat was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the grounding of all flights 
cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
c. Inaction / Positive outcome (True Negative): The President decided NOT to ground 
any aircraft and the threat was discovered to be a hoax. The media reports that the 
grounding of all flights cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
d. Inaction / Negative outcome (False Negative): The President decided NOT to ground 
any aircraft and a flight departing Chicago O'Hare airport exploded over Lake Michigan, 
killing 298 individuals aboard. The media reports that the resulting panic from the 
successful attack cost the U.S. economy $100 billion.  
Question: To what extent did the President take the right action? (1 worst decision 
possible, 7 best decision possible) 
Text box: Why? (Please write any thoughts) 
 
Counterfactual consideration (unused) 
 
Now consider the alternative scenarios that could have occurred: if the President took 
action, it could have resulted in a unnecessary waste of resources or it could have resulted 
in the terrorist threat being mitigated. If the President did not take action, it could have 
obviated the need to expend resources unnecessarily or it could have resulted in a 
disastrous strike by terrorists. 
 
Question: Now after considering the alternatives, to what extent was the President 
justified in taking the action that was taken? 
 
 136 
Text box: Please enter your reasoning for why you think the President was justified or 
unjustified in taking the action that they took, after taking into consideration the potential 
alternative outcomes. 
 
 
 
Study 3 
 
Accountability manipulation language 
 
No accountability condition: Imagine you are the mayor of a small town. You are in your 
second term and you will not be facing re-election because you are term limited. 
 
Accountability condition: Imagine you are the mayor of a small town. You are in the first 
term of  
your and you are seeking re-election in November 2016. 
 
For each of the above conditions: skip logic to end of block 
 
Slider choices (randomized, single item presented, three total items, page break 
between) 
Environmental protection issue 
 
Low uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would protect the 
environment. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing the release of funds to clean 
up the town’s reservoir, which was recently found to contain high levels of contaminants.  
 
Your advisors believe that signing this executive order has a 90% chance of saving 
approximately 100 lives a year. However, the high cost of the clean up efforts will mean 
that a hospital you planned to renovate will not be fixed during your term. According to 
hospital officials, the new renovations would have saved 90 lives a year.  
 
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?  
Slider 0-100% 
 
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the 
effectiveness of the cleanup efforts. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you 
need to be 100% likely to sign the executive order? 
 
Slider 0-10% 
 
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block) 
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Medium uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would protect 
the environment. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing the release of funds to 
clean up the town’s reservoir, which was recently found to contain high levels of 
contaminants.  
 
Your advisors believe that signing this executive order has a 50% chance of saving 
approximately 100 lives a year. However, the high cost of the clean up efforts will mean 
that a hospital you planned to renovate will not be fixed during your term. According to 
hospital officials, the new renovations would have saved 50 lives a year.  
 
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?  
 
Slider 0-100% 
 
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the 
effectiveness of the clean up efforts. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you 
need to be 100% likely to sign the executive order? 
 
Slider 0-50% 
 
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block) 
 
 
High uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would protect the 
environment. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing the release of funds to clean 
up the town’s reservoir, which was recently found to contain high levels of contaminants.  
 
Your advisors believe that signing this executive order has a 10% chance of saving 
approximately 100 lives a year. However, the high cost of the clean up efforts will mean 
that a hospital you planned to renovate will not be fixed during your term. According to 
hospital officials, the new renovations would have saved 10 lives a year.  
 
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?  
 
Slider 0-100% 
 
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the 
effectiveness of the clean up efforts. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you 
need to be 100% likely to sign the executive order? 
 
Slider 0-90% 
 
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block) 
 
For all three of the above conditions (low, medium, high): skip logic to end of block 
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Block 4 
 
Slider choices (randomized, single item presented, three total items, page break 
between) 
 
Gun Control (leave this title out), Labeled Safety 
 
Low uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would tackle the 
issue of guns in your community. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing 
stringent background investigations for gun buyers.  
 
Your advisors estimate that this bill has a 90% chance of saving 100 lives a year that 
would have been lost due to gun violence. However, devoting additional manpower to 
conduct background investigations will require taking several police officers off of street 
duty. Police leadership believe that 90 people a year will die without these officers on 
patrol. 
 
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?  
 
Slider 0-100% 
 
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the 
bill. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you need to be 100% likely to sign the 
executive order? 
 
Slider 0-10% 
 
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item) 
 
 
Medium uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would tackle 
the issue of guns in your community. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing 
stringent background investigations for gun buyers.  
 
Your advisors estimate that this bill has a 50% chance of saving 100 lives a year that 
would have been lost due to gun violence. However, devoting additional manpower to 
conduct background investigations will require taking several police officers off of street 
duty. Police leadership believe that 50 people a year will die without these officers on 
patrol. 
 
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?  
 
Slider 0-100% 
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Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the 
bill. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you need to be 100% likely to sign the 
executive order? 
 
Slider 0-50% 
 
(present questions 1 and 2 as a single item, skip logic to end of block) 
 
 
High uncertainty: You made a promise during your campaign that you would tackle the 
issue of guns in your community. The city council has sent you a bill authorizing 
stringent background investigations for gun buyers.  
 
Your advisors estimate that this bill has a 10% chance of saving 100 lives a year that 
would have been lost due to gun violence. However, devoting additional manpower to 
conduct background investigations will require taking several police officers off of street 
duty. Police leadership believe that 10 people a year will die without these officers on 
patrol. 
 
Question 1: As currently described, how likely are you to sign the bill into law?  
 
Slider 0-100% 
 
Question 2: Your advisors tell you that they can ask for further research to be done on the 
bill. What amount of uncertainty reduction would you need to be 100% likely to sign the 
executive order? 
 
Slider 0-90% 
 
Study 4 
 
Experiment 1 
Overall situation setup 
The independence movement inside the province of Apple has pushed the central 
government to hold a referendum on whether or not Apple should be independent from 
the Union of Provinces. The winning side in the referendum needs to receive over 50% of 
the total votes cast.  
You will be asked to estimate the likelihood that the “No camp” will win the election. 
You will be presented new information about the election and you will be asked to update 
your estimates after each new piece of information. 
In the accountability condition: You will be asked to explain your rationales for why 
you assigned the probability that you assigned. Please write a rationale of a sentence 
or longer. 
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Low certainty starting point 
At three weeks before the referendum, the “No independence” camp’s lead has dwindled 
and the two are now running at a statistical dead heat (50/50). There is still a lot of time 
before the referendum vote though: Apple citizens are beginning to pay more attention to 
the referendum and a series of debates is about to start.  
1. Current Polling Trends. Through most of the year, the No vote held a consistent lead 
in the available polls. But at the "3 weeks to go" mark, the No camp is even with the Yes 
camp. 
Given this evidence, how likely is it that the No camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new 
package of self-rule initiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes No to 
independence. The most famous author in Apple publicly urges his compatriots to vote 
No on secession. A very senior diplomat born in Apple who served for 30 years in senior 
roles for the Union of Provinces urges Apple to vote Yes, saying a 
sovereign Apple would still "fit naturally alongside" other nations in regional 
organizations. 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
3. Political Slogans. The key Yes theme has been hope for a new future. The Key No 
theme has been uncertainty and the risks of Apple going it alone in the world. 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
4. Latest Polling Data. Entering the final two weeks, a poll puts the Yes camp in the lead 
for the first time. Trendlines show opponents and undecideds breaking toward yes, 
although most polls still show an overall lead for the No camp. After the final public 
debate, 71% of voters say the pro-independence leader won the debate. 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
5. Past Referendums Part A. A study of 34 referendums on the subject of independence 
or constitutional reform since 1980 found an average swing of 11% of votes toward the 
status quo in the final month of polling. Critics of the study point out the cases are too 
different to be directly comparable. 
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Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
6. Past Referendums Part B. A noted sociologist commented that polls had 
overestimated the Yes or pro-change vote in 12 of 16 referendums around the world. The 
sociologist also said the polls may be underestimating the No vote because of a "spiral of 
silence". 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
7. Polling Models. Another study concludes that polling models have a difficult time 
accounting for people who rarely or never vote in regular elections but will come out for 
big issues like independence referendums. 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
High certainty starting point 
At three weeks before the referendum, the “No independence” camp’s lead has solidified 
and they now have a significant lead over the “Yes independence” camp. There is still a 
lot of time before the referendum vote though: Applans are beginning to pay more 
attention to the referendum and a series of debates is about to start.  
1. Current Polling Trends. Through most of the year, the No vote held a consistent lead 
in the available polls. But at the "3 weeks to go" mark, the No camp has pulled ahead of 
the Yes camp. 
Given this evidence, how likely is it that the No camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new 
package of self-rule intiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes No to 
independence. The most famous author in Apple publicly urges his compatriots to vote 
No on secession. A very senior diplomat born in Apple who served for 30 years in senior 
roles for the Union of Provinces urges Apple to vote Yes, saying a 
sovereign Apple would still "fit naturally alongside" other nations in regional 
organizations. 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
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3. Political Slogans. The key Yes theme has been hope for a new future. The Key No 
theme has been uncertainty and the risks of Apple going it alone in the world. 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
4. Latest Polling Data. Entering the final two weeks, a poll puts the Yes camp in the lead 
for the first time. Trendlines show opponents and undecideds breaking toward yes, 
although most polls still show an overall lead for the No camp. After the final public 
debate, 71% of voters say the pro-independence leader won the debate. 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
5. Past Referendums Part A. A study of 34 referendums on the subject of independence 
or constitutional reform since 1980 found an average swing of 11% of votes toward the 
status quo in the final month of polling. Critics of the study point out the cases are too 
different to be directly comparable. 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
 
6. Past Referendums Part B. A noted sociologist commented that polls had 
overestimated the Yes or pro-change vote in 12 of 16 referendums around the world. The 
sociologist also said the polls may be underestimating the No vote because of a "spiral of 
silence". 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
7. Polling Models. Another study concludes that polling models have a difficult time 
accounting for people who rarely or never vote in regular elections but will come out for 
big issues like independence referendums. 
 
Given this evidence and considering all previous evidence, how likely is it that the No 
camp will win the election? (Slider) 
 
 
For accountability conditions, add text box, please explain why you made the 
estimate that you made 
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Experiment 2 
 
Bayesian Version 
 
High Certainty = 95% of past referendums in this country have succeeded. Citizens of 
Apple tend to vote for changing the status quo.  
Low Certainty = 50% of past referendums in this country have succeeded. Citizens of 
Apple tend to be uncertain about change and approach it cautiously. 
 
Low Certainty 
1. Current Polling Trends. The most recent polling data shows more support for 
secession than unity. You know from studying the polls that they are predictive of 
election outcomes in seven out of the last ten elections, when the outcome of the election 
is for a change to the status quo (such as a secession). 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	1 = (0.7)(0.5)0.7 0.5 + (0.3)(1 − 0.5) = 70% 
 
2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new 
package of self-rule initiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes for unity. You 
know from past attempts at mollifying the Applan citizenry that new packages of policies 
appeal only six out of the last ten times. 
 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	2 = (0.6)(0.7)0.6 0.7 + (0.4)(1 − 0.7) = 77.78% 
 
3. Political Slogans. You believe that the group in favor of secession has the more 
compelling slogan. From past referendums, you know that the group who you felt had the 
more compelling slogan has won two out of the last ten referendums. 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	3 = (0.2)(0.7778)0.2 0.7778 + (0.8)(1 − 0.7778) = 46.67% 
 
4. Latest Polling Data. As the vote draws near, both groups increase the frequency of 
their rallies. Although both sides are holding a comparable number of rallies, statistics 
indicate that the group favoring secession has an average rally size that is three times that 
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of the opposition’s. In past situations, rally size has been a correct indicator for how the 
vote would play out in one out of the last ten referendums. 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	4 = (0.1)(0.4667)0.1 0.4667 + (0.9)(1 − 0.4667) = 8.862% 
 
5. Past Referendums. A study of past referendums on the subject of independence or 
constitutional reform found that they have a higher chance of failing than referendums on 
other subjects. The results revealed that seven out of the last ten referendums on the 
subject of independence or constitutional reform had passed.   
 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	5 = (0.7)(0.08862)0.7 0.08862 + (0.3)(1 − 0.08862) = 18.49% 
 
6. Debate. One week before the referendum, the nation holds a debate between the group 
in favor of secession and the group in favor of unity. After the debate, news outlets begin 
reporting that the group in favor of secession had won the debate. In the past, six out of 
the last ten winners of a debate of this scale were able to win their referendums.    
 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	6 = (0.6)(0.1849)0.6 0.1849 + (0.4)(1 − 0.1849) = 25.39% 
 
7. Polling Models. Waiting in line to vote, you receive news that the polling models that 
news outlets have been using has a high likelihood of inaccuracy. Only four out the last 
ten polling models have accurately predicted the referendum results. 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)  𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	7 = (0.4)(0.2539)0.4 0.2539 + (0.6)(1 − 0.2539) = 18.49% 
 
High Certainty 
1. Current Polling Trends. The most recent polling data shows more support for 
secession than unity. You know from studying the polls that they are predictive of 
election outcomes in seven out of the last ten elections, when the outcome of the election 
is for a change to the status quo (such as a secession).  
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
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𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	1 = (0.7)(0.95)0.7 0.95 + (0.3)(1 − 0.95) = 97.79% 
 
2. Public Figures Chime In. The Prime Minister of the Union of Provinces offers a new 
package of self-rule initiatives on taxes and social policy if Apple votes for unity. You 
know from past attempts at mollifying the Applan citizenry that new packages of policies 
appeal only six out of the last ten times. 
 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	2 = (0.6)(0.9779)0.6 0.9779 + (0.4)(1 − 0.9779) = 98.52% 
 
3. Political Slogans. You believe that the group in favor of secession has the more 
compelling slogan. From past referendums, you know that the group who you felt had the 
more compelling slogan has won two out of the last ten referendums. 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	3 = (0.2)(0.9852)0.2 0.9852 + (0.8)(1 − 0.9852) = 94.33% 
 
4. Latest Polling Data. As the vote draws near, both groups increase the frequency of 
their rallies. Although both sides are holding a comparable number of rallies, statistics 
indicate that the group favoring secession has an average rally size that is three times that 
of the opposition’s. In past situations, rally size has been a correct indicator for how the 
vote would play out in one out of the last ten referendums. 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	4 = (0.1)(0.9433)0.1 0.9433 + (0.9)(1 − 0.9433) = 64.89% 
 
5. Past Referendums. A study of past referendums on the subject of independence or 
constitutional reform found that they have a higher chance of failing than referendums on 
other subjects. The results revealed that seven out of the last ten referendums on the 
subject of independence or constitutional reform had passed.   
 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
 146 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	5 = (0.7)(0.6489)0.7 0.6489 + (0.3)(1 − 0.6489) = 81.18% 
 
6. Debate. One week before the referendum, the nation holds a debate between the group 
in favor of secession and the group in favor of unity. After the debate, news outlets begin 
reporting that the group in favor of secession had won the debate. In the past, six out of 
the last ten winners of a debate of this scale were able to win their referendums.     
 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry) 
𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	6 = (0.6)(0.8118)0.6 0.8118 + (0.4)(1 − 0.8118) = 86.61% 
 
7. Polling Models. Waiting in line to vote, you receive news that the polling models that 
news outlets have been using has a high likelihood of inaccuracy. Only four out the last 
ten polling models have accurately predicted the referendum results. 
Given this evidence, how likely is secession? (Manual Entry)  
 𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	7 = (0.4)(0.8661)0.4 0.8661 + (0.6)(1 − 0.8661) = 81.18% 
 
 
Study 5 
 
Insight Puzzles 
 
Baghdad Attack (Duncker’s Radiation Problem Isomorph) 
 
Imagine you are the chief intelligence advisor to a military commander in charge of 
attacking Baghdad (the capital city of Iraq). At the time of the attack, Iraq is ruled by 
Saddam Hussein, who presides from within the capital. The city is situated in the middle 
of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads lead to the capital through 
the Iraqi countryside, but the countryside itself is too rough for your men to pass through 
directly. To take the city, your commander knows he will need to get his entire army 
inside the city walls. In order to do so, he has gathered his army at the head of one of the 
roads, ready to launch a full-scale direct assault. Before the attack begins, however, the 
general learns that Saddam had planted explosive mines on each of the roads. The mines 
were set so that small groups of men could pass over them safely, since the dictator 
needed to move his troops and workers to and from the capital. However, any large force 
would detonate the mines. Not only would this destroy the road, but it would also destroy 
many neighboring villages. The commander knows that the entire force and the element 
of surprise are necessary to take the city, given the strength of the defenders. It therefore 
seems impossible to capture the city. What do you advise your commander to do? 
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Special Operations Mission (Missionaries and cannibals riddle isomorph) 
 
Imagine you are the mission commander of a small special operations team tasked with 
extracting three high value targets (in this case, high ranking terrorist leaders) inside a 
hostile country. Because the country you are operating in does not have knowledge of 
your presence, your superior officer has only authorized three individuals to enter the city 
where the targets are being held.  Your team members report that they have arrived at the 
enemy compound (Objective Green) and located all three targets. The team members are 
disguised as civilians and must transport these targets to a safe house (Objective Blue) 
approximately 1 mile from Objective Green, where they will wait for an extraction team 
(a stealth helicopter landing on the roof).   Your team members have acquired a small 
civilian vehicle that can transport up to a total of three individuals at any one time. You 
must develop a plan for all of your team members and all of the targets to be transported 
to Objective Blue. At no time can the team members be outnumbered by the targets 
because the targets can overpower the team members if they find themselves with a 
numerical advantage. The vehicle must be driven by a team member and cannot be sent 
from Objective Blue to Green or from Objective Green to Blue without any occupants 
(i.e., it cannot drive itself or be controlled remotely).   Write out a plan to get everyone, 
team members and targets, to Objective Blue.  
 
Drone Surveillance (Mutilated Chessboard Problem Isomorph) 
 
 
 
A terrorist target has just been located in a large city that is approximately 62 square 
miles (see the city layout above). In order to ensure that the terrorist target does not leave 
undetected, you have been ordered to conduct drone surveillance of the city. If each 
drone can cover 2 contiguous square miles of the city, what is the minimum number of 
drones you would need to cover the entire city? Why do you need that many drones?     
 
Air Defense (Tree Planting Riddle Isomorph) 
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Imagine you are in charge of protecting a sensitive military installation with ten defensive 
emplacements (in this case, surface-to-air missile units). In order to properly defend the 
site, the ten defensive emplacements must be arrayed in five rows of four emplacements 
each. How should you array the emplacements? 
 
 
Answers:  
 
1. Since the entire force is required to capture the city, it is necessary for the commander 
to move the whole Army into the center of the city. However, it is not necessary to move 
the entire Army along the same road. The commander should be advised to split the 
Army into smaller elements and move them along as many roads as necessary to avoid 
tripping the mines. 
 
2.  Yes, it is possible to move the detainees from one objective to the other. 
 
OBJ Green --> Vehicle --> OBJ Blue 
abc123--> 
                               1a -->  
                                  --->              a 
                                 1 <-- 
123bc<-- 
                            12b -->               
                                                     1a 
                                <--2b 
23bc  
                                   23b--> 
                                                     12ab 
                                        3 <-- 
3c 
                                    3c--> 
                                                        123abc 
 
 
3. You need 32 drones to cover the 62 squares. Because of how the city is arrayed, it is 
impossible to cover all 62 squares with only 31 drones. 
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4. You should array the ten batteries in a star shape 
 
          x 
 x    x    x    x 
      x      x     
          x       
     x        x 
 
 
Algebra Problems 
1. (3x2 + 2x + 10)(3x) =  
2. (2x + y)(3x - y) =  
3. Factor:    16y2 - 40yz + 25z2 
4. Find X 
  
 
5. 18x2 + (24x / 3x) = 
6. Factor:  x2 + 6x + 9    
7. Solve for x:  (1/5)(x) + 10 – 25 = 0 
8. (-6x2y4) / (3x5y3) =  
 
Answers 
 
Alg1.  
 
Alg2. 
 
Alg3. 
 
Alg4. 
6 
Alg5. 
 
Alg6. 
 
Alg7. 
75 
Alg8. 
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Individual Differences and Manipulation Check Scales 
 
Post-Experiment Accountability Manipulation Check 
 
I believe I 
will be 
evaluated 
on the 
decision 
making 
strategies I 
utilized (and 
not on the 
accuracy of 
the 
outcomes) 
   
 
  
 
  
 
   I believe I 
will be 
evaluated 
on the 
accuracy of 
my final 
predictions 
(and not on 
the 
decision 
making 
strategies I 
utilized) 
[PAOA1] 
The 
researchers 
will ask me 
to explain 
the decision 
making 
strategy I 
used to 
make my 
final 
predictions. 
            The 
researchers 
will ask me 
to explain 
why my 
final 
predictions 
were right 
or wrong. 
[PAOA2] 
The 
researchers 
are more 
concerned 
with how I 
made my 
decisions 
and the 
effectiveness 
of my 
decision 
making 
strategies. 
            The 
researchers 
are more 
concerned 
with 
whether my 
predictions 
are 
ultimately 
right or 
wrong. 
[PAOA3] 
Even if my             Even if the 
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predictions 
are 
inaccurate, I 
may still be 
evaluated 
favorably if 
the strategy 
I used to 
make my 
decisions 
was sound. 
strategies I 
used to 
make my 
decisions 
are sound, I 
will still be 
evaluated 
unfavorably 
if my final 
decisions 
are 
ultimately 
wrong. 
[PAOA4]  
 
Please describe in the box below how you went about making your predictions  
Why did you choose to make your predictions in this way?  
4. [Measures of rational/analytic reasoning – Novak & Hoffman, 2008] 
While making my predictions… Disagree 
strongly 
          Agree 
strongly 
1. I reasoned things out 
carefully. [Analytic1] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I tackled the task 
systematically.[Analytic2] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I figured things out 
logically. [Analytic3] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I approached the task 
analytically.[Analytic4] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I was very focused on the steps 
involved in doing it. [Analytic5] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I applied precise rules to deduce my 
final predictions. [Analytic6] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I was very focused on what I was 
doing to arrive at my final 
predictions. [Analytic7] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I was very aware of my thinking 
process.[Analytic8] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I arrived at my final predictions by 
carefully assessing the information in 
front of me. [Analytic9] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I used clear rules. [Analytic10] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5.  [Emotions] 
 
  Not 
at 
all 
          Very 
Happy [Happy] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contented [Content] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gloomy [Gloomy] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tense [Tense] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Good [Good] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Agreeable [Agreeable] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Discouraged [Discouraged] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Peaceful [Peaceful] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Upset  [Upset] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mad [Mad] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disgusted [Disgusted] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fearful [Fearful] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Stressed [Stressed] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
5. Need for cognition scale 
[Need for cognition (shortened), Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984] 
  
[Randomize items] 
  
  Strongly 
disagree 
          Strongly 
agree 
1. I would prefer complex to simple 
problems. [NCog1] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I like to have the responsibility of 
handling a situation that requires 
a lot of thinking. [NCog2] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Thinking is not my idea of 
fun.* [NCog3] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I would rather do something that 
requires little thought than 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 153 
something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking 
abilities.*[NCog4] 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid 
situations where there is likely a 
chance I will have to think in 
depth about something.*[NCog5] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating 
hard and for long hours. [NCog6] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I only think as hard as I have 
to.*[NCog7] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily 
projects to long-term 
ones.* [NCog8] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I like tasks that require little 
thought once I’ve learned 
them.* [NCog9] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. The idea of relying on thought to 
make my way to the top appeals 
to me.[NCog10] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves 
coming up with new solutions to 
problems.[NCog11] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Learning new ways to think 
doesn’t excite me very 
much.* [NCog12] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with 
puzzles that I must 
solve. [NCog13] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly 
is appealing to me. [NCog14] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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15. I would prefer a task that is 
intellectual, difficult, and 
important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require 
much thought. [NCog15] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I feel relief rather than 
satisfaction after completing a 
task that required a lot of mental 
effort.* [NCog16] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. It’s enough for me that something 
gets the job done; I don’t care 
how or why it works.* [NCog17] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I usually end up deliberating 
about issues even when they do 
not affect me 
personally. [NCog18] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
7. Big 5 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
          Strongly 
agree 
1. I get chores done right away. [Consc1] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I often forget to put things back in 
their proper place. [Consc2] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I like order. [Consc3] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I make a mess of things [Consc4] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I sympathize with others’ 
feelings. [Agree1] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am not interested in other people’s 
problems. [Agree2] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I feel others’ emotions. [Agree3] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am not really interested in 
others. [Agree4] 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am the life of the party. [Extro1] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I don’t talk a lot. [Extro2] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I talk to a lot of different people at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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parties.[Extro3] 
12. I keep in the background. [Extro4] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I have a vivid imagination. [Open1] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I am not interested in abstract 
ideas. [Open2] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I have difficulty understanding 
abstract ideas. [Open3] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I do not have a good 
imagination. [Open4] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I have frequent mood 
swings [Neuro1] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I am relaxed most of the 
time. [Neuro2] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I get upset easily. [Neuro3] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I seldom feel blue. [Neuro4] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Fluid Intelligence Measure 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
 
Please answer the following questions:  [Frederick, 2005, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives]  
   
(a) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ______ [5 cents] [CR1]  
   
(b) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? ______ [5 minutes] [CR2]  
   
(c) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? ______  [47 days] [CR3] 
 
Cognitive Motivation Measure 
 
Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOMT) 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
          Strongly 
agree 
1. Allowing oneself to be convinced by 
an opposing argument is a sign of good 
character 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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2. People should take into consideration 
evidence that goes against their beliefs.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. People should revise their beliefs in 
response to new information or 
evidence. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Changing your mind is a sign of 
weakness.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Intuition is the best guide in making 
decisions  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It is important to persevere in your 
beliefs even when evidence is brought to 
bear against them.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. One should disregard evidence that 
conflicts with one's established beliefs.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. People should search actively for 
reasons why their beliefs might be 
wrong.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. It is more useful to pay attention to 
those who disagree with us than to pay 
attention to those who agree. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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